Economic Analysis of Decision Making and Organization Based on Other-Regarding Preferences

基于其他偏好的决策和组织的经济分析

• 批准号: 13630005
• 负责人: ITOH Hideshi
• 金额: $ 1.15万
• 依托单位: HITOTSUBASHI UNIVERSITY
• 依托单位国家: 日本
• 项目类别: Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
• 财政年份: 2001
• 资助国家: 日本
• 起止时间: 2001 至 2002
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://kaken.nii.ac.jp/grant/KAKENHI-PROJECT-13630005/
• 关键词: SOCIAL PREFERENCE; INCENTIVE; PRINCIPAL; AGENT; BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS; FAIRNESS; SELF-INTEREST; CONTRACT THEORY; 多面的動機づけ; 補完性; 相対地位; 社会的関係; 公正; 複数エージェント; 相対的地位; コーポレート・ガバナンス; 組織再編

In this research I attempt to obtain new theoretical insights by combining the standard moral hazard models of principal-agent relationships with theories of other-regarding (inequity averse or status-seeking) preferences, that are consistent with many experimental results. In the benchmark principal-agent model, the principal and the agent are both risk neutral, while the agent is wealth constrained, and hence the basic tradeoff between incentives and rent extraction arises. I show that other-regarding preferences interact with incentives in nontrivial ways. In particular, the principal is in general worse off as the agent cares more about the well-being of the principal. I then extend the analysis to a multi-agent setting. When each agent cares about the well-being of the other agent, either a team contract or a relative performance contract is optimal even though there is no technological externality nor correlation. The extreme team contract is "fair" and more likely to be optimal as actions become mutually observable. However, team contracts are never optimal when the agents are competitive or status-seeking. I also show that the information structure also affects the optimal contract. Another important result I obtain is that the optimal contract for self-interest agents changes drastically when a small degree of other-regarding preferences is introduced. Under the technological assumption of the model, if the agents are self-interested, there is an optimal independent contract in which the payment scheme for each agent depends only on the outcome of his project. However, when the agents become other-regarding, however small the changes are, no independent contract is optimal any longer and the optimal contract is generically unique.

在本研究中，我试图通过将委托代理关系的标准道德风险模型与其他(不公平厌恶或地位寻求)偏好理论相结合来获得新的理论见解，这与许多实验结果是一致的。在基准委托代理模型中，委托人和代理人都是风险中性的，而代理人是财富约束的，因此出现了激励和租金提取之间的基本权衡。我的研究表明，与他人相关的偏好会以不平凡的方式与激励相互作用。特别是，由于代理人更关心委托人的福祉，委托人的境况总体上更差。然后，我将分析扩展到多主体设置。当每个代理人关心另一个代理人的福祉时，团队契约或相对绩效契约是最优的，即使没有技术外部性或相关性。极端团队合同是“公平的”，随着行动变得相互可观察，更有可能是最优的。然而，当经纪人是竞争性的或寻求地位时，团队合同从来都不是最优的。信息结构对最优契约也有影响。我得到的另一个重要结果是，当引入少量的与他人有关的偏好时，自利代理人的最优契约发生了巨大变化。在模型的技术假设下，如果代理人是自利的，则存在一个最优独立契约，其中每个代理人的支付方案仅取决于其项目的结果。然而，当代理人变得与他人无关时，无论变化多么微小，独立契约不再是最优的，最优契约通常是唯一的。