Research on Strategic Information Revelation in Organizations and Networks
组织和网络中的战略信息揭示研究
基本信息
- 批准号:13630004
- 负责人:
- 金额:$ 2.43万
- 依托单位:
- 依托单位国家:日本
- 项目类别:Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
- 财政年份:2001
- 资助国家:日本
- 起止时间:2001 至 2003
- 项目状态:已结题
- 来源:
- 关键词:
项目摘要
The purpose of this research project was to analyze the effects of strategic behaviors at interim period of economic agents, who are asymmetrically endowed with information about their preference relations and initial endowments, on the performance of markets through price mechanism in the economy relying on the cooperative extensions of Bayesian game framework. During the course of our research works, we have obtained various results including the following :1)The analytical framework of cooperative extensions of Bayesian game is constructed and the some of the preliminary results concerning the interim core and the strong equilibrium contracts are obtained. Much of this work is summarized in a forthcoming book to be published from an international publisher.2)In a Bayesian pure exchange economy the Bayesian incentive-compatible coarse core is proved to be nonempty. On the other hand, the Bayesian incentive-compatible interim core may be empty, even for Bayesian pure exchange economies satisfying the traditional (neoclassical) assumptions. A sufficient condition for the latter's non-emptiness is established ; the condition specifies relationships among effects of different type profiles.3)In the case of a large Bayesian economy the Bayesian incentive-compatible interim core is proved to be non-empty without imposing a stringent condition imposed in the case of finite economies in (2).4)In our research effort of analyzing incentive efficient transfers of risky and safety assets among economic organizations and agents, as an initial basic result we first proved an existence a monetary equilibrium in a general equilibrium setting without transactions costs but with buying and selling price spreads.
本研究的目的是通过贝叶斯博弈框架的合作扩展,分析经济主体在过渡时期的策略行为对市场绩效的影响,这些经济主体被不对称地赋予关于其偏好关系和初始禀赋的信息,通过经济中的价格机制。1)构建了贝叶斯博弈合作扩展的分析框架,得到了关于过渡核心和强均衡契约的一些初步结果。这一工作的大部分内容将在即将出版的一本书中总结,该书将由一位国际经济学家出版。2)在贝叶斯纯交换经济中,贝叶斯激励相容粗核被证明是非空的。另一方面,贝叶斯激励相容的临时核心可能是空的,即使是满足传统(新古典)假设的贝叶斯纯交换经济体。建立了后者非空的一个充分条件;该条件规定了不同类型分布的效应之间的关系。3)在大型贝叶斯经济体的情况下,贝叶斯激励相容的临时核心被证明是非空的,而不施加在(2)中有限经济体情况下施加的严格条件。4)在我们分析经济组织和代理人之间风险资产和安全资产的激励有效转移的研究工作中,作为最初的基本结果,我们首先证明了在没有交易成本但有购买的一般均衡环境中存在货币均衡,销售价差。
项目成果
期刊论文数量(25)
专著数量(0)
科研奖励数量(0)
会议论文数量(0)
专利数量(0)
Tatsuro Ichiishi, Akira Yamazaki: "Cooperative Extensions of the Bayesian Game"World Scientific Publishing Co., Inc., New York. 250 (2005)
Tatsuro Ichiishi、Akira Yamazaki:“贝叶斯博弈的合作扩展”世界科学出版公司,纽约。
- DOI:
- 发表时间:
- 期刊:
- 影响因子:0
- 作者:
- 通讯作者:
Akira Yamazaki, Tatsuro Ichiishi: "A Large Bayesian Economy and Incentive Compatible Core Contracts"Mathematical Analysis in Economics(institute of Mathematical Analysis, Kyoto University). 1264. 45-54 (2002)
Akira Yamazaki,Tatsuro Ichiishi:“大型贝叶斯经济和激励兼容核心合同”经济学中的数学分析(京都大学数学分析研究所)。
- DOI:
- 发表时间:
- 期刊:
- 影响因子:0
- 作者:
- 通讯作者:
市石達郎, 山崎 昭: "Introduction to Cooperative Extensions of the Bayesian Game"『経済の数理解析』数理解析講究録. 1264. 1-26 (2002)
Tatsuro Ichiishi、Akira Yamazaki:“贝叶斯博弈的合作扩展简介”《经济学的数学分析》数学分析 Kokyuroku。1264. 1-26 (2002)
- DOI:
- 发表时间:
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- 影响因子:0
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- 通讯作者:
Akira Yamazaki: "Indeterminancy of Buying and Selling Price Spread in Monetary Equilibrium without Transactions Costs"Mathematical Analysis in Economics(Institute of Mathematical Analysis, Kyoto University). (forthcoming). (2004)
Akira Yamazaki:“无交易成本的货币均衡中买卖价差的不确定性”经济学中的数学分析(京都大学数学分析研究所)。
- DOI:
- 发表时间:
- 期刊:
- 影响因子:0
- 作者:
- 通讯作者:
Tatsuro Ichiishi, Akira Yamazaki: "Cooperative Extensions of the Bayesian Game"World Scientific Publishing Co., Inc. : New York(forthcoming). (2005)
Tatsuro Ichiishi、Akira Yamazaki:“贝叶斯博弈的合作扩展”世界科学出版公司:纽约(即将出版)。
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- 影响因子:0
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YAMAZAKI Akira其他文献
YAMAZAKI Akira的其他文献
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{{ truncateString('YAMAZAKI Akira', 18)}}的其他基金
A Study of Levy Processes in Finance
金融征税流程研究
- 批准号:
26380402 - 财政年份:2014
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$ 2.43万 - 项目类别:
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
Storm-track variability prior to blocking: Mechanism and predictability
阻塞前的风暴轨迹变化:机制和可预测性
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25800267 - 财政年份:2013
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$ 2.43万 - 项目类别:
Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
On a derivative pricing theory with jumps and stochastic volatilities
具有跳跃和随机波动的衍生品定价理论
- 批准号:
24830087 - 财政年份:2012
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$ 2.43万 - 项目类别:
Grant-in-Aid for Research Activity Start-up
The Empirical Research on the Economic Society in Potsdam in its First Stage
波茨坦经济社会第一阶段的实证研究
- 批准号:
22520732 - 财政年份:2010
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Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
Theoretical Analysis of an Economic System with Information andTransaction Networks in Market Economies
市场经济中具有信息和交易网络的经济系统的理论分析
- 批准号:
22530188 - 财政年份:2010
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A study of the role of integrated institute of welfare and education and teaching curriculum
福利与教育教学课程综合学院的作用研究
- 批准号:
19530493 - 财政年份:2007
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$ 2.43万 - 项目类别:
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
The Empirical Research on Conflicts and Regulative Functions in the Rulal Society of Brandenburg in the First Half of the 19^<th> Century
19世纪上半叶勃兰登堡乡村社会冲突与调节功能的实证研究
- 批准号:
19520620 - 财政年份:2007
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$ 2.43万 - 项目类别:
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
Differential Information and Cooperative Bayesian Games in Market Economies
市场经济中的差分信息与合作贝叶斯博弈
- 批准号:
19530160 - 财政年份:2007
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$ 2.43万 - 项目类别:
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
A empirical study on family structure and manorial control of the nobility in early modern Brandenburg
近代早期勃兰登堡贵族家庭结构与庄园控制的实证研究
- 批准号:
16520433 - 财政年份:2004
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$ 2.43万 - 项目类别:
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A PRACTICAL STUDY OF SELF-ACTUALIZATION ON CHILDHOOD TO JUVENILE
儿童至青少年自我实现的实践研究
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10610121 - 财政年份:1998
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$ 2.43万 - 项目类别:
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
相似海外基金
Iterative Processes of Decision Making: A Bayesian Game Theoretic Framework
决策的迭代过程:贝叶斯博弈论框架
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