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Research on Strategic Information Revelation in Organizations and Networks

组织和网络中的战略信息揭示研究

基本信息

批准号：
13630004
负责人：
YAMAZAKI Akira
金额：
$ 2.43万
依托单位：
Hitotsubashi University
依托单位国家：
日本
项目类别：
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
财政年份：
2001
资助国家：
日本
起止时间：
2001 至 2003
项目状态：
已结题

项目摘要

The purpose of this research project was to analyze the effects of strategic behaviors at interim period of economic agents, who are asymmetrically endowed with information about their preference relations and initial endowments, on the performance of markets through price mechanism in the economy relying on the cooperative extensions of Bayesian game framework. During the course of our research works, we have obtained various results including the following :1)The analytical framework of cooperative extensions of Bayesian game is constructed and the some of the preliminary results concerning the interim core and the strong equilibrium contracts are obtained. Much of this work is summarized in a forthcoming book to be published from an international publisher.2)In a Bayesian pure exchange economy the Bayesian incentive-compatible coarse core is proved to be nonempty. On the other hand, the Bayesian incentive-compatible interim core may be empty, even for Bayesian pure exchange economies satisfying the traditional (neoclassical) assumptions. A sufficient condition for the latter's non-emptiness is established ; the condition specifies relationships among effects of different type profiles.3)In the case of a large Bayesian economy the Bayesian incentive-compatible interim core is proved to be non-empty without imposing a stringent condition imposed in the case of finite economies in (2).4)In our research effort of analyzing incentive efficient transfers of risky and safety assets among economic organizations and agents, as an initial basic result we first proved an existence a monetary equilibrium in a general equilibrium setting without transactions costs but with buying and selling price spreads.

本研究的目的是通过贝叶斯博弈框架的合作扩展，分析经济主体在过渡时期的策略行为对市场绩效的影响，这些经济主体被不对称地赋予关于其偏好关系和初始禀赋的信息，通过经济中的价格机制。1）构建了贝叶斯博弈合作扩展的分析框架，得到了关于过渡核心和强均衡契约的一些初步结果。这一工作的大部分内容将在即将出版的一本书中总结，该书将由一位国际经济学家出版。2）在贝叶斯纯交换经济中，贝叶斯激励相容粗核被证明是非空的。另一方面，贝叶斯激励相容的临时核心可能是空的，即使是满足传统（新古典）假设的贝叶斯纯交换经济体。建立了后者非空的一个充分条件;该条件规定了不同类型分布的效应之间的关系。3）在大型贝叶斯经济体的情况下，贝叶斯激励相容的临时核心被证明是非空的，而不施加在（2）中有限经济体情况下施加的严格条件。4）在我们分析经济组织和代理人之间风险资产和安全资产的激励有效转移的研究工作中，作为最初的基本结果，我们首先证明了在没有交易成本但有购买的一般均衡环境中存在货币均衡，销售价差。