Research on Strategic Information Revelation in Organizations and Networks

组织和网络中的战略信息揭示研究

基本信息

批准号：
13630004
负责人：
YAMAZAKI Akira
金额：
$ 2.43万
依托单位：
Hitotsubashi University
依托单位国家：
日本
项目类别：
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
财政年份：
2001
资助国家：
日本
起止时间：
2001 至 2003
项目状态：
已结题

项目摘要

The purpose of this research project was to analyze the effects of strategic behaviors at interim period of economic agents, who are asymmetrically endowed with information about their preference relations and initial endowments, on the performance of markets through price mechanism in the economy relying on the cooperative extensions of Bayesian game framework. During the course of our research works, we have obtained various results including the following :1)The analytical framework of cooperative extensions of Bayesian game is constructed and the some of the preliminary results concerning the interim core and the strong equilibrium contracts are obtained. Much of this work is summarized in a forthcoming book to be published from an international publisher.2)In a Bayesian pure exchange economy the Bayesian incentive-compatible coarse core is proved to be nonempty. On the other hand, the Bayesian incentive-compatible interim core may be empty, even for Bayesian pure exchange economies satisfying the traditional (neoclassical) assumptions. A sufficient condition for the latter's non-emptiness is established ; the condition specifies relationships among effects of different type profiles.3)In the case of a large Bayesian economy the Bayesian incentive-compatible interim core is proved to be non-empty without imposing a stringent condition imposed in the case of finite economies in (2).4)In our research effort of analyzing incentive efficient transfers of risky and safety assets among economic organizations and agents, as an initial basic result we first proved an existence a monetary equilibrium in a general equilibrium setting without transactions costs but with buying and selling price spreads.

该研究项目的目的是分析经济代理人中期战略行为的影响，他们在不对称地赋予了有关其偏好关系和初始捐赠的信息，对通过经济价格机制的绩效，依靠依靠贝叶斯游戏框架的合作扩展的经济性能。在研究工作过程中，我们获得了各种结果，包括以下结果：1）构建了贝叶斯游戏合作扩展的分析框架，并获得了有关临时核心和强大平衡合同的一些初步结果。即将出版的一本书将从国际出版商出版。2）在贝叶斯纯交换经济中，贝叶斯与激励兼容的粗核被证明是非空的。另一方面，即使对于满足传统（新古典）假设的贝叶斯纯交换经济体来说，贝叶斯激励兼容的临时核心也可能是空的。建立了后者的非空缺状况的充分条件；条件指定了不同类型概况的影响之间的关系。3）对于较大的贝叶斯经济的情况下，贝叶斯激励兼容兼容兼容的临时核心被证明是非空的，而不会在（2）.4中施加有限经济的严格条件。一般均衡设置中的货币平衡，没有交易成本，但价格差价为买卖。