Income distribution and fiscal decentralization

本研究考察了财政分权对收入分配和资源配置的影响。首先，我们研究了日本地方财政中财政分权的再分配后果。为了分析这个问题，我们采用多变量优化的概念。本文的政策启示是：（1）政府的改革应以提高效率为中心;（B）赠款的拨款改革要比税收下放更为可取。其次，我们试图找到最佳的地方赠与税的公式。结果表明，本文提出的分配公式可以同时减少抑制效应和重排序效应，实现财政能力的均等化。第三，分析了地方政府提供公共消费品和公共投入的财政协调问题，在这种情况下，公共投入和公共消费品的收益均向其他地区溢出。主要结论如下：（1）公共投入和公共消费品的供给都可能不足;（B）改变公共支出模式存在帕累托改进;（3）在公共投入和公共消费品都具有高外部性的地区，增加公共投入和减少公共消费品对各地区都有好处。最后，我们分析了不完全竞争条件下关税、商品税和生产补贴政策协调的福利效应。特别是，我们调查的影响，部分协调：虽然成员国同意协调只有一个政策变量，他们仍然可以使用其他政策变量作为战略手段。我们证明了同时降低关税可以实现严格的帕累托改进。另一方面，与商品税和生产补贴相关的部分协调的战争效果取决于企业的生产技术和消费者的偏好。

This study considers the effects of fiscal decentralization on income distribution and resource allocation. First, we examine the redistributive consequences of fiscal decentralization in Japanese local public finance. To analyze this issue, we employ the concepts of multivariate majorisation. The policy implications obtained here as follows : a) the reform should be focused upon the improvement of efficiency ; and b) the reform regarding with the allocation of grants will be more desirable than the devolution of taxes. Second, we try to find the optimal formula of the Local Grant Tax. It is shown that the allocation formula proposed here can reduce both disincentive and re-ranking effects, achieving the equalization of fiscal capacity. Third, we try to analyze fiscal coordination where local governments provide the public consumption goods and public inputs in which both benefits of public inputs and public consumption goods spill over to other regions. The main results are the following : a) it may be possible to have under-provision of both public inputs and consumption goods ; b) there exists Pareto improvement from changing the pattern of public spending ; and c) each region may benefit from increasing the public inputs and reducing the public consumption goods, where both public goods have high externalities. Finally, we analyze the welfare effects of policy coordination of tariffs, commodity taxes and production subsidies under an imperfect competition. In particular, we investigate the effects of partial coordination : while the member countries agree to coordinate only one of their policy variables, they can still use other policy variables as strategic devices. We show that the simultaneous reduction of tariff can achieve the strictly Pareto improvement. On the other hand, the warfare effects of partial coordination related to the commodity taxes and production subsidies depend on the production technology of firms and the preference of the consumers.