Rent Seeking and Endogenous Tariff Rate

这个研究项目最初的目的是研究在一个寻租模型中，一组人赞成征收或提高关税，另一组人反对征收或提高关税，关税税率是如何确定的。为了完成这个研究项目，需要研究适用于公共经济学、政治经济学和国际经济学等许多经济领域的一般寻租博弈，因为一般寻租博弈的结果可以应用于几个特定的内生决定关税税率的模型，每个模型都可以解释为一个寻租博弈。在进行这个研究项目之后，我获得了一些新的重要成果。其中一些在著名经济协会的国际会议上发表和/或发表在国际期刊上，如《公共经济理论杂志》、《经济动态与控制杂志》和《公共选择》。

The original aim of this research project was to study how the tariff rate is determined in a rent-seeking model where a group is in favor of imposing or increasing the tariff rate and the other group is opposed to imposing or increasing the tariff rate. To do this research project, it was needed to study the general rent-seeking game applied to many economic fields such as public economics, political economics and international economics, since the results for the general rent-seeking game can be applied to several specific models endogenously determining the tariff rate, each of which can be interpreted as a rent-seeking game. After pursuing this research project, I obtained several new and important results. Some of them were reported in international conferences of well known economic associations and/or published in refereed international journals, Journal of Public Economic Theory, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, and Public Choice.