Theoretical and Experimental Study of Whistlebrower Protection Act and Corporation Compliance

运用博弈论和经济实验方法对《吹哨人保护法》进行了研究。举报人有动机为了社会公正和消费者的利益举报公司的不公正行为。另一方面，他会被怀疑他对公司的忠诚，并被贴上叛徒的标签。所以我们用内疚厌恶理论来模拟这样一个吹口哨者的行为。然后，我们将该理论扩展到集体内疚责任理论。

Whistlebrower Protection Act was investigated by game theory and economic experiment. A whistlebrower has motive to report an unjust conduct in a corporation for social justice and consumer's benefit. On the other hand, he will be doubted his royalty for the corporation and is given a label as a traitor. So we modeled such a whistlebrower's behavior by guilt aversion theory. We then extended the theory toward a theory of collective guilt responsibility.