A study on the peculiar role of activist funds in corporate governance and corporate control transactions

近年来，日本的收购基金在管理层收购交易中对目标公司进行了积极的投资，它们是这些冲突交易中的重要参与者。通过审查冲突交易的价值，法院区分了可取的MBO和不可取的MBO。日本公司法在规制这些冲突交易中的目标董事和控股股东时，严重依赖事后司法审查。由于日本公司法在理论和制度上的缺陷，司法甄别功能没有发挥好。功能等同的美国。S.日本公司法应引入董事和控股股东对中小股东的诚信义务和衡平救济制度。

Buyout funds in Japan actively invest in target corporations in MBO transactions recently and they are essential players in these conflict transactions. By reviewing the merits of the conflict transactions, courts discern desirable MBOs from undesirable ones. Japanese Corporate Law has heavily relied on ex post judicial review in regulating target directors and controlling shareholders in these conflict transactions. Because of the doctrinal and institutional deficiencies in Japanese Corporate Law the judicial screening function does not work well. The functional equivalents of the U. S. fiduciary duties of directors and controlling shareholders to minority shareholders and the equitable remedies should be introduced to Japanese Corporate Law.