Payoff Allocation Problem in Patent Pools: Coalition Formation, Investment in Development, and Efficiency

Shapley值是收益分配问题中最常用的解概念。然而，在现实市场中，有许多公司使用的技术不是通过专利池获得许可的，因此我们需要考虑具有联盟结构的博弈的Shapley值的性质，因为它是专利池中收益分配问题的更合适的解概念。这项研究最重要的结果是，尽管它不是对专利池本身的分析，但我们发现，在某些情况下，具有联盟结构的游戏的Shapley值并没有被执行为稳定的讨价还价结果。通过拍卖和加权投票的实验来确定收益分配。

Shapley value is the most popular solution concept in payoff allocation problems. In the real markets, however, there are many firms that use technologies that are not licensed via patent pools, and thus we need to consider the properties of Shapley values for the games with coalition structures because it is more appropriate solution concept for the payoff allocation problem in patent pool. The most important result of this research was, although it is not the analysis of patent pool itself, that we found some situations where the Shapley values for games with coalition structures is not implemented as stable bargaining outcomes. Experiments of auctions and weighted voting were also conducted for a situation where payoff allocation is determined via such mechanisms.