Payoff Allocation Problem in Patent Pools: Coalition Formation, Investment in Development, and Efficiency

Shapley值是收益分配问题中最常用的解的概念。然而，在真实的市场中，有许多企业使用的技术并不是通过专利池获得许可的，因此我们需要考虑具有联盟结构的博弈的Shapley值的性质，因为Shapley值更适合于专利池中的收益分配问题。本研究的最重要的结果是，虽然它不是专利池本身的分析，我们发现了一些情况下，夏普利值的联盟结构的游戏没有实现稳定的谈判结果。拍卖和加权投票的情况下，收益分配，通过这种机制进行了实验。

Shapley value is the most popular solution concept in payoff allocation problems. In the real markets, however, there are many firms that use technologies that are not licensed via patent pools, and thus we need to consider the properties of Shapley values for the games with coalition structures because it is more appropriate solution concept for the payoff allocation problem in patent pool. The most important result of this research was, although it is not the analysis of patent pool itself, that we found some situations where the Shapley values for games with coalition structures is not implemented as stable bargaining outcomes. Experiments of auctions and weighted voting were also conducted for a situation where payoff allocation is determined via such mechanisms.