On possibility of constructing social choice functions which are nonmanipulable by preferences adjacent to the sincere ones

论构建不受与真诚偏好相邻的偏好操纵的社会选择函数的可能性

• 批准号: 22730167
• 负责人: SATO Shin
• 金额: $ 1.16万
• 依托单位: Fukuoka University
• 依托单位国家: 日本
• 项目类别: Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
• 财政年份: 2010
• 资助国家: 日本
• 起止时间: 2010 至 2011
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://kaken.nii.ac.jp/grant/KAKENHI-PROJECT-22730167/
• 关键词: ミクロ経済学; 社会的選択; 耐戦略性; 耐隣接操作性

The possibility of constructing rules which do not give agents an incentive to misreport information on preferences in social choices is one of the most important topics in microeconomics. In this research, I propose a new property of rules, called"AM-proofness", which prevents agents from misreporting their preferences, and find logical relationship to"strategy-proofness"which has played a central role in the earlier researches.

构建规则的可能性不会激励代理人在社会选择中错误报告偏好信息，这是微观经济学中最重要的主题之一。在这项研究中，我提出了一种新的规则属性，称为防AM属性，它可以防止代理错误报告他们的偏好，并找到与早期研究中起核心作用的策略防策略之间的逻辑关系。

项目成果

A sufficient condition for the equivalence of strategy-proofness and nonmanipulability by preferences adjacent to the sincere one

• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2012.12.001
• 发表时间: 2013
• 期刊: J. Econ. Theory
• 作者: Shin Sato

Adjacent manipulation

相邻操纵

• 发表时间: 2010
• 作者: Shin Sato;Shin Sato;久保誠二郎;佐藤伸;久保誠二郎;Shin Sato;佐藤伸;佐藤伸
• 通讯作者: 佐藤伸