On possibility of constructing social choice functions which are nonmanipulable by preferences adjacent to the sincere ones

构建规则的可能性，使其不激励主体在社会选择中误报偏好信息，是微观经济学中最重要的主题之一。在这项研究中，我提出了一种新的规则属性，称为“am -proof”，它可以防止代理误报他们的偏好，并找到了在早期研究中发挥核心作用的“策略-proof”的逻辑关系。

The possibility of constructing rules which do not give agents an incentive to misreport information on preferences in social choices is one of the most important topics in microeconomics. In this research, I propose a new property of rules, called"AM-proofness", which prevents agents from misreporting their preferences, and find logical relationship to"strategy-proofness"which has played a central role in the earlier researches.