Security analysis of quantum cryptographic schemes in the presence of side channels

量子密码方案可以根据窃听攻击的强度进行分类，从而保证其安全性。最强的方案是安全的，即使设备制造商无意中或恶意地留下了一个侧通道，一个不受控制的信息泄漏。到目前为止，这种场景中的安全性证明并不令人满意，因为需要防止不可预见的交互。这样的证明是当前项目的目标，也是一种分析，可以帮助发现现有协议中潜在的侧通道漏洞。由于侧信道的物理性质应该保持不确定，因此只能使用抽象量子信息理论的工具，包括用于干扰-信息增益权衡的新的一般不等式。

Quantum cryptographic schemes can be classified by the strength of the eavesdropping attacks against which security can be guaranteed. The strongest schemes are secure even if the manufacturer of the devices has unwittingly or maliciously left a side channel, an uncontrolled leak of information. Security proofs in this scenario are so far not satisfactory because of the necessity to safeguard against unforeseen interactions. Such a proof is an aim of the current project, but also an analysis which may help to spot potential side channel loopholes in existing protocols. Since the physical nature of the side channel should remain unspecified, only tools of abstract quantum information theory can be used, including a new general inequality for the disturbance-information gain tradeoff.