Building Bridges in Ethics: Connecting Metaethics and Normative Ethics

在日常生活中，我们经常面临复杂的伦理问题。吃肉或堕胎是不对的吗？哲学家们通过两种方式处理这些具体的问题。应用伦理学家用最好的哲学分析工具直接研究这些问题。相比之下，规范伦理学试图找到能够同时给出所有伦理问题正确答案的一般原则。例如，功利主义者建议，我们应该总是做能带来最普遍幸福的事情，而美德伦理学家则声称，我们应该做一个完全道德的代理人会站在我们的立场上做的事情。我们也会问更多关于道德的理论问题，甚至在日常生活中也是如此。我们想知道道德主张是否属实，或者道德是否只是一个品味问题。元伦理学系统地研究这类更高层次的问题。它聚焦于三个问题：-当我们说一种行为是对的或错的时，我们是什么意思？-当我们做出这样的道德判断时，我们处于一种什么样的精神状态？-使道德主张成为事实的事件状态的本质是什么？例如，行为的对与错在某种程度上取决于我们的判断或文化吗？在回答这些问题时，元伦理学家借鉴了语言哲学、心灵哲学和形而上学(研究存在的东西)中的最好理论。然而，只有少数元伦理学家认为他们应该研究规范伦理学，以便回答关于道德语言、思想和道德属性(如对和错)的核心问题。同样，规范伦理学家在试图理解哪些行为是对的，哪些是错的时，很少考虑这些更具理论性的问题。这就是为什么这两个领域往往相互独立地进行。然而，这似乎没有任何充分的理由。考虑哪些行为是对的，哪些是错的，应该有助于我们理解我们道德语言和思想的本质，反之亦然，这一想法很有吸引力。在这种情况下，从事规范伦理学工作的人应该听取元伦理学家的意见，元伦理学家应该向规范伦理学家学习。这就是为什么研究这两个领域之间的联系有可能改变这两个领域。研究项目将分为两个部分。这些部分将同时进行，即使第一部分的结果将有助于指导第二部分。第一部分将考察不同的哲学家过去是如何理解元伦理学和规范伦理学之间的联系的。我将看看这些尝试，以证明元伦理学中的主要观点对什么是对什么是错没有任何影响。这些论点通常是由那些捍卫道德语言表达我们的欲望和情感的人提出的，也是那些认为行为的道德品质具有自己独特类型的人提出的。我还将批判性地审视那些试图从元伦理学或元伦理学结论中得出道德结论的论点，这些结论建立在对与错的基础上。例如，理查德·黑尔著名地辩称，因为道德主张表达了一般的规定，所以某种形式的功利主义是正确的。该项目的第二部分发展了一种新的方式来理解规范伦理学和元伦理学之间的联系。我将辩称，规范伦理学家将需要解释他们最喜欢的伦理理论为什么是可知的正确的。在这样的解释中，他们将不得不依赖于关于道德语言、思想和属性的元伦理学观点。这意味着规范伦理学家必须做元伦理学，元伦理学家必须做规范伦理学。我还会争辩说，元伦理学中最好的观点将限制哪些伦理理论是站得住脚的。如果这是正确的，那么道德哲学的这些领域是深深交织在一起的，因此在这些领域取得进展将需要元伦理学和规范伦理学之间更多的合作。

In everyday life, we often face complex ethical questions. Is it wrong to eat meat or to have an abortion? Philosophers approach such concrete questions in two ways. Applied ethicists investigate these questions directly with the best analytic tools of philosophy. Normative ethics, in contrast, attempts to find general principles that could give the right answers to all ethical questions at the same time. Utilitarians, for example, suggest that we should always do whatever brings about most general happiness, whereas virtue ethicists claim that we should do whatever a fully virtuous agent would do in our shoes. We also ask more theoretical questions about morality, even in everyday life. We wonder whether moral claims can be true or whether morality is merely a matter of taste. Metaethics investigates this type of higher-order questions systematically. It focuses on three questions: - What do we mean when we say that an action is right or wrong?- What kind of a mental state are we in when we make moral judgments like this?- What is the nature of states of affairs that make moral claims true? Do rightness and wrongness of actions somehow depend on our judgments or culture, for example?When answering these questions, metaethicists draw from the best theories in philosophy of language, philosophy of mind and metaphysics (the study of what there is). However, only few metaethicists think that they should study normative ethics in order to answer the central questions about moral language, thought and moral properties (such as rightness and wrongness). Likewise, normative ethicists rarely consider these more theoretical questions when they attempt to understand which actions are right and wrong. This is why these two fields tend to proceed independently of one another. Yet, there does not seem to be any good reasons for this. It is appealing to think that considering which actions are right and wrong should help us to understand the nature of our moral language and thought, and vice versa. In this case, those working in normative ethics should listen to metaethicists and metaethicists should learn from the normative ethicists. This is why investigating the connection between these two fields has potential for transforming both fields.The research project will have two parts. These parts will be pursued simultaneously, even if the results of the first part will help to guide the second part. The first part will investigate how different philosophers have understood the connection between metaethics and normative ethics in the past. I will look at the attempts to show that the main views in metaethics do not have any consequences for what is right and wrong. These arguments have usually been put forward by those who defend the idea that moral language expresses our desires and emotions and by those who think that moral qualities of actions are of their own unique kind. I will also critically examine the arguments that have tried to draw moral conclusions from metaethics or metaethical conclusions on the basis of what is right and wrong. For example, Richard Hare famously argued that because moral claims express general prescriptions some form of utilitarianism is true.The second part of the project develops a new way of understanding the connection between normative ethics and metaethics. I will argue that normative ethicists will need to explain why their favourite ethical theories are knowably true. In such explanations, they will have to rely on metaethical views about moral language, thought and properties. This means that normative ethicists must do metaethics and metaethicists normative ethics. I will also argue that the best views in metaethics will constrain which ethical theories are defensible. If this is right, then these areas of moral philosophy are deeply intertwined and therefore making advances in these fields will require much more co-operation between metaethics and normative ethics.