COmpetition models and cross-Subsidies for equitable and green MObility - COSMO
公平和绿色出行的竞争模式和交叉补贴 - COSMO
基本信息
- 批准号:EP/Y001001/1
- 负责人:
- 金额:$ 16.83万
- 依托单位:
- 依托单位国家:英国
- 项目类别:Research Grant
- 财政年份:2023
- 资助国家:英国
- 起止时间:2023 至 无数据
- 项目状态:未结题
- 来源:
- 关键词:
项目摘要
Mobility systems are on the brink of revolution as they suffer from an overloaded infrastructure causing users' dissatisfaction, pollution, increased inequality, health dangers. In London alone, exposure to NO2 accounts for 5900 fatalities/year, with healthcare costs of 1.4BGBP/year. For these reasons, the UK Government identified Future Mobility as one of the four Grand Challenges.At the same time, the advent of new forms of mobility and big data provides remarkable opportunities. In this context, Intermodal Mobility -- where different modes of transport provide complementary services -- is a promising paradigm, as it combines efficient long-distance transport with last-mile services.However, their operation has resulted in equally many challenges. Most notably, transportation authorities struggle to understand how new mobility solutions should be integrated within the existing infrastructure, how to orchestrate and regulate them in a cohesive way, and how to identify those that will ultimately improve equitability and reduce system-wide congestion. At its core, these challenges stems from the fact that privately-owned mobility providers often have objectives that are misaligned with those of the transportation authority (e.g., maximise profit vs minimise congestion/inequity), and result in competing with existing modes of transport as opposed to complementing them.To address these challenges, COSMO aims to develop mathematical models to describe the competition between mobility providers, to analyse these models, and to exploit them to design optimisation-based and cooperation-inducing subsidies to reconcile the providers interest with that of improving equitability, minimising congestion, or a combination thereof.More in details, the first component will deliver a threefold set of cohesive contributions: i) the development of a concise game-theoretic model for competition between different mobility providers, ii) the study of the resulting equilibria, and iii) the design of efficient equilibrium computing algorithms. Building atop the first, the second component will leverage recent breakthroughs in optimization and game theory to design optimization-based cross-subsidies that trade-off between maximising equitability and minimising congestion/emissions.These two components will culminate in the release of an open-access algorithmic suite, whose effectiveness will be tested on synthetic and real-world case studies on US cities and the Borough of Greenwich, shared and developed jointly with project partners. In the spirit of this call, the research will be carried out in close collaboration with leaders in smart mobility (Dr. Pavone, Stanford University & NVIDIA Research) and transportation (Dr. Osorio, HEC Montreal & Google Research), with whom a number of networking activities have been co-designed including an extended visit at Stanford University and HEC Montreal, daily visits and invited talks at NVIDIA Research and Google Research.
移动系统正处于革命的边缘,因为它们遭受超载的基础设施,导致用户的不满,污染,不平等加剧,健康危险。仅在伦敦,每年就有5900人因接触NO2而死亡,每年的医疗费用为1.4亿英镑。因此,英国政府将未来移动性确定为四大挑战之一。与此同时,新形式的移动性和大数据的出现提供了巨大的机遇。在这方面,多式联运-不同的运输模式提供互补服务-是一种有前途的模式,因为它将有效的长途运输与最后一英里服务结合在一起,但其运作也带来了同样多的挑战。最值得注意的是,交通部门很难理解新的移动解决方案应该如何整合到现有的基础设施中,如何以一种有凝聚力的方式协调和监管它们,以及如何确定那些最终将改善公平性和减少全系统拥堵的解决方案。这些挑战的核心是,私营移动服务提供商的目标往往与交通管理局的目标不一致(例如,为了应对这些挑战,COSMO旨在开发数学模型来描述移动供应商之间的竞争,分析这些模型,并利用它们来设计基于优化和合作的补贴,以协调供应商的利益与改善公平性,最大限度地减少拥堵,更详细地说,第一组件将提供三重的内聚贡献集:i)开发用于不同移动性提供商之间的竞争的简明博弈论模型,ii)研究所得到的均衡,以及iii)设计有效的均衡计算算法。在第一个组件的基础上,第二个组件将利用优化和博弈论领域的最新突破来设计基于优化的交叉补贴,在最大化公平性和最小化拥堵/排放之间进行权衡。这两个组件将最终发布开放获取算法套件,其有效性将在美国城市和格林威治自治市的合成和现实案例研究中进行测试。与项目合作伙伴共同分享和开发。本着这一呼吁的精神,该研究将与智能移动领域的领导者密切合作进行。(Pavone博士,斯坦福大学和NVIDIA研究)和交通(Osorio博士,蒙特利尔HEC和谷歌研究),与他共同设计了一些网络活动,包括对斯坦福大学和蒙特利尔HEC的长期访问,每天访问NVIDIA Research和Google Research并受邀参加讲座。
项目成果
期刊论文数量(0)
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Dario Paccagnan其他文献
Utility Design for Distributed Resource Allocation—Part I: Characterizing and Optimizing the Exact Price of Anarchy
分布式资源分配的效用设计——第一部分:描述和优化无政府状态的确切价格
- DOI:
10.1109/tac.2019.2961995 - 发表时间:
2018 - 期刊:
- 影响因子:6.8
- 作者:
Dario Paccagnan;R. Chandan;Jason R. Marden - 通讯作者:
Jason R. Marden
Stochastic Strategies for Robotic Surveillance as Stackelberg Games
Stackelberg Games 的机器人监控随机策略
- DOI:
10.1109/tcns.2021.3058932 - 发表时间:
2020 - 期刊:
- 影响因子:4.2
- 作者:
Xiaoming Duan;Dario Paccagnan;F. Bullo - 通讯作者:
F. Bullo
Utility Design for Distributed Resource Allocation—Part II: Applications to Submodular, Covering, and Supermodular Problems
分布式资源分配的效用设计——第二部分:子模、覆盖和超模问题的应用
- DOI:
- 发表时间:
2018 - 期刊:
- 影响因子:6.8
- 作者:
Dario Paccagnan;Jason R. Marden - 通讯作者:
Jason R. Marden
On the Efficiency of Nash Equilibria in Aggregative Charging Games
论聚合收费博弈中纳什均衡的效率
- DOI:
- 发表时间:
2018 - 期刊:
- 影响因子:3
- 作者:
Dario Paccagnan;F. Parise;J. Lygeros - 通讯作者:
J. Lygeros
Fair Interventions in Weighted Congestion Games
加权拥塞游戏中的公平干预
- DOI:
- 发表时间:
2023 - 期刊:
- 影响因子:0
- 作者:
Miriam Fischer;Martin Gairing;Dario Paccagnan - 通讯作者:
Dario Paccagnan
Dario Paccagnan的其他文献
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