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Transparency in Procurement: The design and use of information in trading mechanisms

采购透明度：交易机制中信息的设计和使用

基本信息

批准号：
ES/N00776X/1
负责人：
Jozsef Sakovics
金额：
$ 79.39万
依托单位：
University of Edinburgh
依托单位国家：
英国
项目类别：
Research Grant
财政年份：
2016
资助国家：
英国
起止时间：
2016 至无数据
项目状态：
已结题

来源：
https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=ES%2FN00776X%2F1
关键词：
Transparency Procurement design use information

项目摘要

This proposal is motivated by the need to reduce the public deficit. One way to do this is by achieving efficiency savings in procurement for large public institutions such as the National Health Service, city councils, or the Ministry of Defence. We propose to contribute towards this goal by attempting to better align the stylised theoretical analysis of tendering - a form of trading mechanism - with the facts on the ground. The focus of our study is the provision and use of information in the tendering process, building on two recent methodological developments: "Information Design" and "Simple Auctions". Trading mechanisms have been the subject of a great deal of study, especially in the last half a century. More recently, the enormously successful sale of the 3G mobile phone licences by simultaneous auctions - £22.5 billion was raised for the public purse and the band of radio frequency was efficiently assigned - in 2000, provided vivid evidence of how useful this theory can be. The literature on "auctions" is focussed on finding the optimal trading mechanism, which maximizes expected benefits. However, on the one hand, this optimization assumes that the information available to the bidders is predetermined. This is often too strong an assumption as the bid taker may have significant leeway in choosing what information to gather and disclose. On the other hand, the optimization traditionally leaves both the complexity of the mechanism and its use of the information revealed by the bidders unconstrained. This often results in very complicated "optimal" mechanisms, which are hard to implement in practice.We propose to push out the research frontier by analysing what information, and in which form, is presented to the potential traders and how information revealed by them is used by the designer to determine prices and trades.The first of these novel ideas is information design: the optimal provision of information to a group of interacting agents by a designer with a certain objective. By strategically choosing its method for scoring the bids and by seeking out and revealing additional facts that might affect the cost of suppliers, the designer can create interdependence between the agents' information; this can then be exploited through the competitive bidding process, ultimately benefiting the designer's objective. The second idea is based on the observation that due to the complex objective of the buyer (quality, timing, transparency, sustainability etc. in addition to price) most actual tenders are multi-dimensional: the bids submitted include several different factors besides price. While a pre-announced scoring rule can transform these bids into readily comparable one-dimensional scores, it does not eliminate the complexity of bids and of the bidders' beliefs about the bids of others. For practical reasons, the designer needs to compensate for this innate complication by simplifying the mechanism, resulting in additional restrictions on the set of mechanisms she can choose from. These restrictions imply that families of mechanisms previously discarded as sub-optimal, now become relevant. To capture this scenario, we analyse decentralised mechanisms, where conditional on trading, prices are independent of the bids of competitors. In the context of scoring auctions, this would correspond to a discriminatory "first-score" auction. According to the existing theoretical literature, when the quantity traded is not set beforehand, these auctions are not optimal.Together, these two approaches make it possible to advance our understanding of issues like simultaneous bidding and realistic mechanisms that deal with interdependent valuations. While doing that we will also pay particular attention not to be hemmed in by the artificial boundary between micro- and macro-economic analyses, so that our insights can be exported to system-wide markets, such as the labour and credit markets.

这项提议的动机是需要减少公共赤字。实现这一目标的一种方法是在大型公共机构（如国家卫生服务体系、市议会或国防部）的采购中实现效率节约。我们建议通过尝试将投标（一种交易机制）的风格化理论分析与实际情况更好地结合起来，为实现这一目标做出贡献。我们的研究重点是在招标过程中提供和使用信息，以两种最新的方法发展为基础：“信息设计”和“简单拍卖”。贸易机制一直是大量研究的主题，尤其是在过去半个世纪。最近，在2000年，3G移动电话牌照的同步拍卖取得了巨大的成功——为公共财政筹集了225亿英镑，无线电频率的频段也得到了有效分配——生动地证明了这一理论的实用性。关于“拍卖”的文献关注的是寻找期望收益最大化的最优交易机制。然而，一方面，这种优化假设竞标者可以获得的信息是预先确定的。这种假设往往过于强烈，因为竞标者在选择收集和披露哪些信息方面可能有很大的回旋余地。另一方面，传统的优化既不限制机制的复杂性，也不限制竞标者所披露的信息的使用。这通常会导致非常复杂的“最佳”机制，而这些机制在实践中很难实现。我们建议通过分析哪些信息、以何种形式呈现给潜在交易者，以及设计者如何利用这些信息来确定价格和交易，来推动研究前沿。这些新思想中的第一个是信息设计：由具有特定目标的设计师向一组相互作用的代理提供最佳信息。通过策略性地选择对投标进行评分的方法，并通过寻找和揭示可能影响供应商成本的额外事实，设计者可以在代理人的信息之间建立相互依赖；这可以通过竞标过程加以利用，最终实现设计师的目标。第二个想法是基于观察，由于买方的复杂目标（质量，时间，透明度，可持续性等，除了价格），大多数实际投标是多维的：提交的投标包括几个不同的因素，除了价格。虽然预先公布的评分规则可以将这些出价转化为易于比较的一维得分，但它并不能消除出价的复杂性，也不能消除竞标者对其他人出价的看法。出于实际原因，设计师需要通过简化机制来弥补这种固有的复杂性，从而导致她可以选择的机制集受到额外的限制。这些限制意味着以前被视为次优的机制家族现在变得相关了。为了捕捉这种情况，我们分析了去中心化机制，其中以交易为条件，价格独立于竞争对手的出价。在得分拍卖的背景下，这将对应于歧视性的“第一分”拍卖。根据现有的理论文献，当交易数量没有事先设定时，这些拍卖不是最优的。总之，这两种方法可以促进我们对同时竞标和处理相互依赖估值的现实机制等问题的理解。在这样做的同时，我们还将特别注意不要被微观和宏观经济分析之间的人为界限所束缚，以便我们的见解可以输出到整个系统的市场，例如劳动力和信贷市场。