SBE-RCUK Lead Agency: Sequential Bargaining with Externalities

SBE-RCUK 牵头机构：与外部性的连续谈判

基本信息

批准号：
ES/S01053X/1
负责人：
Santiago Oliveros
金额：
$ 27.84万
依托单位：
University of Essex
依托单位国家：
英国
项目类别：
Research Grant
财政年份：
2018
资助国家：
英国
起止时间：
2018 至无数据
项目状态：
已结题

来源：
https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=ES%2FS01053X%2F1
关键词：
SBE RCUK Lead Agency Sequential

项目摘要

Overview:This proposal studies sequential contributions to public goods and joint projects in environments withtransactional frictions. The proposed research has three components. The first component focuses on thepresence of a principal as a source of coordination for the completion of a single public good or collectiveagreement. Motivating examples for this component include bankruptcy restructuring, lobbying/votebuying, technology adoption with network externalities, and corporate takeovers. The researchersconsider the effect on outcomes and welfare of strengthening agents' formal bargaining power relative tothe principal. The second component studies sequential contributions to competing public goods in a fullydecentralized environment (without a principal). Prominent applications include donations to alternativeorganizations, and collective effort in flexible environments, as in open source programming. Theresearchers study efficiency, delay, and the optimal organization of tasks and teamwork in this context.The third component reintroduces principals in the multiple joint projects environment. Motivatingexamples for this component are a congressional party leader leading the party's agenda over diverseissues, a university's development office seeking contributions, and donations with large donors. Theresearchers study how principals actively manage the intertemporal externalities generated by multipleprojects.Intellectual Merit:This proposal is related to the literature on contracting with externalities, delay in bargaining models withcomplete information, and private contributions to public goods. It complements these works by studyingcontributions to multiple projects and the role of principals in dynamic environments with frictions. To dothis, the PIs develop a family of closely related models of multilateral bargaining in the presence ofexternalities, where tasks and contracting are not undertaken by all agents simultaneously. Focusing onsequential bargaining highlights previously unexplored incentives for free riding and their implicationsfor delay and efficiency, while the existence of multiple joint projects generates new incentives forcoordination across projects. A key step in this proposal is to obtain a general tractable model to uncovercommon forces behind sequential contributions to multiple public goods in different setups. The proposedmodel is flexible, and the techniques developed can be used by future researchers concerned withincentives in organizations, charities, etc.Broader Impacts:This research encompasses a variety of applications, ranging from fundraising and donations, to teamproduction and legislative bargaining. The results from this proposal will help to better organize theseactivities in both government and the private sector. In terms of fundraising, for example, this proposalwill provide guidance about how to optimally bundle different public causes when there are multiplesmall donors and how to organize fundraising in the presence of large donors. In terms of effort in teams,it will shed light on how to organize team cooperation with multiple active projects. Results will also beapplicable to optimal organization for modern R&D companies, and open source software communities.The third component, for example, is particular relevant for the design of the institutions regulatingbankruptcy reorganizations. The project will be carried out by two researchers based in the UK and US.Since this proposal involves two different universities in two different continents, it will benefit from twodifferent institutional dissemination efforts in order to reach non-academic audiences and the generalpublic. Students will also be involved to discuss related literature, explore results of simplified modelsunder alternative assumptions, and aid in numerical computations.

概述：该提案研究了与摩擦摩擦的环境中对公共物品和联合项目的顺序贡献。拟议的研究有三个组成部分。第一个组成部分侧重于委托人作为完成单一的公共物品或集体分解的协调来源。该组成部分的激励示例包括破产重组，游说/投票，通过网络外部性采用技术以及公司收购。研究人员审视对增强代理人的正式谈判能力相关的校长的影响和福利的影响。第二个组件研究在完全居中的环境中对竞争公共物品的顺序贡献（没有本金）。重要的应用包括对替代组织的捐款以及在灵活环境中的集体努力，例如开源编程。研究人员在这种情况下研究任务和团队合作的最佳组织效率，延迟。第三个组件重新引入了多个联合项目环境中的主体。该组成部分的激励性示例是国会党的领导人，领导该党的议程多元化，大学的发展办公室寻求捐款，并向大型捐助者捐款。 Theresearchers研究了校长如何积极地管理由多个项目产生的跨期外部性。IntlectualFure：该提案与与外部性签约的文献有关，与外部性的延迟有关，延迟了与内容有关的信息，以及对公共物品的私人贡献。它通过研究对多个项目的贡献以及原理在有摩擦的动态环境中的作用来补充这些作品。对于Dothis来说，PI在外部性的存在下开发了一个密切相关的多边讨价还价模型，其中所有代理人并非同时进行任务和签约。重点讨价还价的讨价还价突出显示了以前未开发的自由骑行的激励措施及其对延迟和效率的影响，而多个联合项目的存在则产生了跨项目的新激励措施。该提案的关键步骤是获得一个通用的可拖动模型，以发现对不同设置中多个公共物品的顺序贡献背后的力量。拟议的模型是灵活的，而开发的技术可以由组织，慈善机构等对侵入的未来研究人员使用。BOADER的影响：这项研究包括各种应用程序，从筹款和捐助，到团队生产到团队生产和立法协议。该提案的结果将有助于更好地组织政府和私营部门的诱因。例如，在筹款方面，该提案将为如何在有多尔斯小捐赠者以及在大型捐助者面前如何组织筹款活动时如何最佳地捆绑不同的公共事业。在团队中的努力方面，它将阐明如何与多个活跃项目组织团队合作。结果还将针对现代研发公司和开源软件社区的最佳组织提供支持。例如，第三个组成部分与调节银行的重新组织的机构的设计特别相关。该项目将由英国和美国的两名研究人员进行。由于该提案涉及两个不同大陆的两所不同大学，它将受益于扭曲的机构传播工作，以吸引非学术的受众和概括公共。学生还将参与讨论相关文献，探索简化模型的替代假设的结果，并有助于数值计算。