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SBE-RCUK Lead Agency: Sequential Bargaining with Externalities

SBE-RCUK 牵头机构：与外部性的连续谈判

基本信息

批准号：
ES/S01053X/2
负责人：
Santiago Oliveros
金额：
$ 11.08万
依托单位：
University of Bristol
依托单位国家：
英国
项目类别：
Research Grant
财政年份：
2020
资助国家：
英国
起止时间：
2020 至无数据
项目状态：
已结题

来源：
https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=ES%2FS01053X%2F2
关键词：
SBE RCUK Lead Agency Sequential

项目摘要

Overview:This proposal studies sequential contributions to public goods and joint projects in environments withtransactional frictions. The proposed research has three components. The first component focuses on thepresence of a principal as a source of coordination for the completion of a single public good or collectiveagreement. Motivating examples for this component include bankruptcy restructuring, lobbying/votebuying, technology adoption with network externalities, and corporate takeovers. The researchersconsider the effect on outcomes and welfare of strengthening agents' formal bargaining power relative tothe principal. The second component studies sequential contributions to competing public goods in a fullydecentralized environment (without a principal). Prominent applications include donations to alternativeorganizations, and collective effort in flexible environments, as in open source programming. Theresearchers study efficiency, delay, and the optimal organization of tasks and teamwork in this context.The third component reintroduces principals in the multiple joint projects environment. Motivatingexamples for this component are a congressional party leader leading the party's agenda over diverseissues, a university's development office seeking contributions, and donations with large donors. Theresearchers study how principals actively manage the intertemporal externalities generated by multipleprojects.Intellectual Merit:This proposal is related to the literature on contracting with externalities, delay in bargaining models withcomplete information, and private contributions to public goods. It complements these works by studyingcontributions to multiple projects and the role of principals in dynamic environments with frictions. To dothis, the PIs develop a family of closely related models of multilateral bargaining in the presence ofexternalities, where tasks and contracting are not undertaken by all agents simultaneously. Focusing onsequential bargaining highlights previously unexplored incentives for free riding and their implicationsfor delay and efficiency, while the existence of multiple joint projects generates new incentives forcoordination across projects. A key step in this proposal is to obtain a general tractable model to uncovercommon forces behind sequential contributions to multiple public goods in different setups. The proposedmodel is flexible, and the techniques developed can be used by future researchers concerned withincentives in organizations, charities, etc.Broader Impacts:This research encompasses a variety of applications, ranging from fundraising and donations, to teamproduction and legislative bargaining. The results from this proposal will help to better organize theseactivities in both government and the private sector. In terms of fundraising, for example, this proposalwill provide guidance about how to optimally bundle different public causes when there are multiplesmall donors and how to organize fundraising in the presence of large donors. In terms of effort in teams,it will shed light on how to organize team cooperation with multiple active projects. Results will also beapplicable to optimal organization for modern R&D companies, and open source software communities.The third component, for example, is particular relevant for the design of the institutions regulatingbankruptcy reorganizations. The project will be carried out by two researchers based in the UK and US.Since this proposal involves two different universities in two different continents, it will benefit from twodifferent institutional dissemination efforts in order to reach non-academic audiences and the generalpublic. Students will also be involved to discuss related literature, explore results of simplified modelsunder alternative assumptions, and aid in numerical computations.

概述：本提案研究了在交易摩擦环境下对公共产品和联合项目的连续贡献。拟议的研究有三个组成部分。第一部分侧重于委托人的存在，作为完成单一公共物品或集体协议的协调来源。这一要素的激励例子包括破产重组、游说/贿选、带有网络外部性的技术采用和公司收购。研究人员考虑了加强代理人相对于委托人的正式议价能力对结果和福利的影响。第二个部分研究在完全分散的环境下（没有本金）对竞争性公共产品的连续贡献。突出的应用包括对替代组织的捐赠，以及灵活环境中的集体努力，如开放源码编程。在此背景下，研究人员研究了效率、延迟以及任务和团队合作的最佳组织。第三部分重新介绍了多个联合项目环境中的主体。这方面的激励例子有：国会政党领导人在各种问题上领导该党的议程，大学发展办公室寻求捐款，以及大型捐助者的捐款。研究者研究了委托人如何积极管理由多个项目产生的跨期外部性。智力价值：这一建议与外部性契约、完全信息下议价模型的延迟以及私人对公共产品的贡献的文献有关。它通过研究对多个项目的贡献以及在充满摩擦的动态环境中校长的角色来补充这些工作。为了做到这一点，pi开发了一系列在存在外部性的情况下密切相关的多边谈判模型，其中任务和合同不是由所有代理同时承担的。关注顺序讨价还价突出了以前未探索的搭便车动机及其对延迟和效率的影响，而多个联合项目的存在产生了跨项目协调的新动机。本建议的一个关键步骤是获得一个通用的可处理模型，以揭示在不同情况下对多种公共产品的连续贡献背后的共同力量。所提出的模型是灵活的，所开发的技术可以被未来研究组织、慈善机构等激励机制的研究人员使用。更广泛的影响：本研究包括各种应用，从筹款和捐赠，到团队生产和立法议价。这项建议的结果将有助于更好地组织政府和私营部门的这些活动。比如，在筹款方面，该提案将指导在有多个小额捐赠者的情况下如何将不同的公益事业进行最佳捆绑，以及在有大型捐赠者的情况下如何组织筹款。在团队努力方面，它将阐明如何组织多个活跃项目的团队合作。结果也将适用于现代研发公司和开源软件社区的最佳组织。例如，第三个组成部分与破产重组监管机构的设计特别相关。该项目将由英国和美国的两名研究人员进行。由于这项建议涉及两个不同大洲的两所不同的大学，因此它将受益于两种不同的机构传播工作，以便接触到非学术受众和普通公众。学生还将参与讨论相关文献，探索在不同假设下简化模型的结果，并协助进行数值计算。