Democracy and independent power in central banks and beyond

中央银行及其他机构的民主和独立权力

• 批准号: ES/V005758/1
• 负责人: Hjalte Christian Lokdam
• 金额: $ 13.91万
• 依托单位: London School of Economics and Political Science
• 依托单位国家: 英国
• 项目类别: Fellowship
• 财政年份: 2020
• 资助国家: 英国
• 起止时间: 2020 至 无数据
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=ES%2FV005758%2F1
• 关键词: Democracy; independent; power; central; banks

The following questions guide my research: What justifies an independent institution's right to reject the demands of a democratically elected government? What gives it the authority to do so? Such questions go to the heart of the idea of central bank independence (CBI) - the insulation of the conduct of monetary policy from elected representatives. In addressing them in my research, I highlight that CBI is fundamentally misunderstood if, as prevalent perspectives do, it is seen merely as an institutional fix to the problem of securing price stability. In contrast to dominant approaches such as those derived from the time-inconsistency theory of Kydland and Prescott (1977), my research demonstrates that CBI cannot be understood on the basis of its economic rationality alone. Rather, it expresses a certain conception of the just society and how it is to be achieved. CBI thereby has important political and constitutional consequences by constraining what governments can do in terms of economic policymaking. The question of whether such constraints are democratically legitimate, then, depends on the source of the central bank's authority. The question of CBI is therefore a question of political and constitutional theory.Approaching CBI as a way of thinking about politics (Freeden 2013), my research employs a unique interdisciplinary approach to trace the historical evolution of the idea in theory and practice from the interwar period to the Eurozone Crisis. I highlight that CBI responds to the problem that the value of money is simultaneously founded on political authority and perpetually threatened by it. In responding to this problem, CBI embodies a theory of the relationship between monetary policy, politics and democratic representation that I reconstruct on the basis of historical and theoretical sources. In short, I highlight that the idea of CBI is premised on the notion that monetary stability is both a precondition for democracy and an expression of democratic will that is more fundamental than that expressed through periodic elections (see also Rosanvallon 2008). However, while this conceptual core is stable, the institutionalisation of CBI differs qualitatively according to the political structure of the community in question. CBI affects how democracies govern themselves, but how it does so varies depending on the foundation of the central bank's authority.It is the independence of the ECB that is the main focus of my PhD thesis. What distinguishes the ECB's independence from that of other major central banks is that it is given a constitutional status. This means that the ECB exercises sovereign powers on behalf of the Eurozone's citizens and states without being politically controlled. The significance of this constitutional arrangement became clear in the emergency politics of the Eurozone Crisis (see, e.g., Streeck 2014; White 2015; Wilkinson 2015) and the ECB played a crucial role in addressing the Crisis (see, e.g., Braun 2017, Verdun 2017, Tortola and Pansardi 2019). Through its actions, the ECB transformed the way in which the Eurozone and its Member States govern themselves (see also Beukers 2013; Ioannidis 2016; Tuori and Tuori 2014). By adopting a political theoretical perspective on these developments, my research demonstrates how they challenge dominant understandings of (state) sovereignty, on the one hand, and how they affect the conditions of democratic self-government in the Eurozone, on the other.During the ESRC PDF I will publish and disseminate the findings of my research to increase its impact in academia and beyond. In addition to this, I will work towards developing a new research agenda that expands upon my existing research in a manner that allows me to address broader questions concerning the historical and theoretical relationship between democracy and the principle of independence in government.

下面的问题指导我的研究：什么证明一个独立的机构有权拒绝民主选举的政府的要求？是什么赋予它这样做的权力？这些问题触及了央行独立性（CBI）理念的核心--将货币政策的实施与民选代表隔离开来。在我的研究中解决这些问题时，我强调，如果像流行的观点那样，CBI仅仅被视为确保价格稳定问题的制度解决方案，那么它从根本上被误解了。与主流观点（如基德兰德和普雷斯科特（Kydland and Prescott，1977）的时间不一致性理论）不同，我的研究表明，不能仅仅根据其经济合理性来理解CBI。相反，它表达了公正社会的某种概念以及如何实现公正社会。因此，CBI通过限制政府在经济决策方面的行为，具有重要的政治和宪法后果。那么，这些限制是否在民主上合法的问题取决于中央银行权力的来源。因此，CBI问题是一个政治和宪法理论问题。我的研究将CBI作为一种思考政治的方式（Freeden 2013），采用独特的跨学科方法，追踪从两次世界大战期间到欧元区危机的理论和实践的历史演变。我强调，CBI回应的问题，货币的价值是建立在政治权威，并不断受到威胁，在回应这个问题，CBI体现了货币政策，政治和民主代表之间的关系，我重建的基础上的历史和理论来源的理论。简而言之，我强调，CBI的想法是基于这样一个概念，即货币稳定既是民主的先决条件，也是民主意愿的表达，这比通过定期选举表达的民主意愿更根本（另见Rosanvallon 2008）。然而，虽然这个概念核心是稳定的，但CBI的制度化根据相关社区的政治结构而有质的不同。CBI影响着民主国家如何管理自己，但其影响方式取决于中央银行权威的基础。我的博士论文主要关注的是欧洲央行的独立性。欧洲央行的独立性与其他主要央行的独立性的区别在于，它被赋予了宪法地位。这意味着欧洲央行代表欧元区公民和国家行使主权权力，而不受政治控制。这一宪法安排的重要性在欧元区危机的紧急政治中变得清晰起来（见，例如，Streeck 2014;白色2015;威尔金森2015）和欧洲央行在应对危机方面发挥了至关重要的作用（参见，例如，Braun 2017，凡尔登2017，托尔托拉和Pansardi 2019）。通过其行动，欧洲央行改变了欧元区及其成员国的治理方式（参见Beukers 2013; Ioanneal 2016; Tuori and Tuori 2014）。通过对这些发展采取政治理论的角度来看，我的研究表明，他们如何挑战（国家）主权的主流理解，一方面，他们如何影响民主自治的条件在欧元区，另一方面.在ESRC PDF期间，我将发表和传播我的研究结果，以增加其在学术界和超越的影响.除此之外，我将努力制定一个新的研究议程，以扩大我现有的研究，使我能够解决有关民主与政府独立原则之间的历史和理论关系的更广泛的问题。