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Explaining Variation in the Type of Support Foreign Sponsors Provide to Warring Factions in Civil War

解释外国赞助商向内战交战派系提供的支持类型的变化

基本信息

批准号：
2269724
负责人：
金额：
--
依托单位：
University of Oxford
依托单位国家：
英国
项目类别：
Studentship
财政年份：
2019
资助国家：
英国
起止时间：
2019 至无数据
项目状态：
未结题

来源：
https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=studentship-2269724
关键词：
Explaining Variation Type Support Foreign

项目摘要

The research aims to analyse the impact of defence pacts on the onset and escalation of inter-state crises. The mainstream interpretation of the role of defensive alliance is provided by extended deterrence theory: a third-party defender threatens the use of force to protect other countries, their territories, and their values from attack (Huth 1988). The superpowers' security guarantees to their allies in Europe and around the world during the Cold War are a case in point. However, the extended deterrence paradigm displays theoretical and empirical limitations. The effectiveness of defence pacts in preventing disputes can be hindered by both security dilemma and moral hazard considerations. Additionally, studies of the deterrent effect of alliances generally share little awareness of the complexities of inter-state crises, escalation, and deterrence (Johnson and Leeds 2011; Benson 2012).This thesis attempts to systematize our understanding of the role of defence pacts in crisis taking into account the complexities of inter-state crisis. While deterrence could be aimed at the prevention of disputes, a successful deterrence strategy may also be deployed for crisis management, preventing it from reaching the level of war. When a crisis begins, the initiator can still engage in crisis bargaining without reaching the level of force; deterrent threats issued in that context clearly state the red lines that should not be passed for peace to be maintained. The literature calls the former type of deterrence described above "general deterrence", and the latter, "immediate deterrence" (Fearon 2002). The most iconic cases of deterrence recorded in history are examples in which two potential belligerents resolved a dispute within a crisis without resorting to force, like the Cuban Missile Crisis. The preliminary hypotheses of my research are that, in a dyad of rival states, given the absence of a clear link between reputation costs of a defensive commitment and crisis onset, either the protégé or the opponent could be moved by the presence of a defensive alliance to initiate a dispute. Once a crisis has started, however, the expected costs of war against the alliance increase, and therefore lower the likelihood of an opponent issuing a violent challenge. Even if the ally's intervention is not certain, an opponent has fewer rational incentives to start a violent dispute than in the case of no alliance. Not only is the defensive alliance not meant to encourage emboldening behaviour, as opposed to an offensive treaty or neutrality pact. Additionally, it is worth expecting that the defender will prevent the protégé's emboldenment. The defender is unlikely to be willing to support a forceful change to the status quo by the protégé, as the ensuing conflict could degenerate into a broader conflict with higher costs. During the Cold War, for example, the two superpowers feared that crises could turn into nuclear confrontations and tried to restrain their partners. As a result, in this new theoretical paradigm, defence pacts should be conducive to crisis onset (low general deterrent power) but have a restraining effect on escalation (high immediate deterrent power).I aim to test these hypotheses with a mixed method approach. First, I will carry out a quantitative analysis of dispute onset and escalation between a potential challenger and a potential target. A large-N analysis of recorded crises appears to be the most appropriate method to test general claims about the overall deterrent effect of alliances. To corroborate this analysis, I aim to analyse several case studies. It is easy to highlight the inevitable limitations of the statistical methodology: in this, as in other models that reduce reality to the essentials, "deductive power is usually purchased at the cost of historical accuracy" (Achen and Snidal 1989). While the reality of historical cases does not necessarily disprove the entire logic...

研究的目的是分析防御条约对国家间危机的爆发和升级的影响。延伸威慑理论提供了对防御性联盟作用的主流解释：第三方防御者威胁使用武力保护其他国家、其领土和价值观免受攻击（Huth，1988）。冷战期间超级大国对欧洲和世界各地盟友的安全保障就是一个很好的例子。然而，延伸威慑范式显示出理论和经验上的局限性。安全困境和道德风险考虑都可能妨碍防卫协定在预防争端方面的效力。此外，对联盟威慑作用的研究通常很少关注国家间危机、升级和威慑的复杂性（约翰逊and利兹，2011;本森，2012）。本文试图将我们对防御条约在危机中的作用的理解系统化，同时考虑到国家间危机的复杂性。虽然威慑的目的可以是防止争端，但成功的威慑战略也可以用于危机管理，防止危机达到战争的程度。当危机开始时，发起者仍然可以在没有达到武力水平的情况下进行危机谈判;在这种情况下发出的威慑性威胁明确指出了维持和平不应逾越的红线。文献称上述前一种威慑为“一般威慑”，后一种为“直接威慑”（Fearon，2002年）。历史上最具代表性的威慑案例是两个潜在的交战国在危机中解决争端而不诉诸武力的例子，如古巴导弹危机。我的研究的初步假设是，在一对敌对国家中，由于防御性承诺的声誉成本与危机爆发之间缺乏明确的联系，无论是被保护者还是对手都可能因防御性联盟的存在而引发争端。然而，一旦危机开始，对联盟发动战争的预期成本就会增加，因此对手发起暴力挑战的可能性就会降低。即使盟友的干预并不确定，对手也比没有联盟的情况下更少有理性的动机来发动暴力争端。与进攻性条约或中立条约相反，防御性联盟不仅不意味着鼓励大胆的行为。此外，值得期待的是，防御者将阻止被保护者的胆大妄为。捍卫者不太可能愿意支持被保护者强行改变现状，因为随之而来的冲突可能会恶化为代价更高的更广泛的冲突。例如，在冷战期间，两个超级大国担心危机可能演变为核对抗，并试图约束他们的伙伴。因此，在这种新的理论范式中，防御条约应该有利于危机的爆发（低的总体威慑力），但对升级（高的直接威慑力）有抑制作用。首先，我将对潜在挑战者和潜在目标之间的争端开始和升级进行定量分析。对记录在案的危机进行大N分析似乎是检验关于联盟的总体威慑作用的一般说法的最适当方法。为了证实这一分析，我打算分析几个案例研究。很容易强调统计方法的不可避免的局限性：在这方面，就像在其他将现实简化为本质的模型中一样，“演绎能力通常是以历史准确性为代价购买的”（Achen和Snidal，1989）。虽然历史案例的现实并不一定否定整个逻辑。