Grotian constitutionalism: Legitimacy and limits in the civil thought of Hugo Grotius

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Hugo Grotius holds a prominent place in the history of political and legal thought; he is known for his 'dual paternity' of both international and natural law (Edwards, 1981: 9). However, I wish to explore his civil philosophy to uncover and examine the constitutional aspects of his thinking. The impetus behind this research is what I perceive to be a dissonance in the literature between Grotius as an internationaltheorist and as a civil philosopher: Grotius, the international theorist, is presented as a proponent of humanitarian intervention; whereas Grotius, the civil philosopher, is depicted as being sympathetic to tyrants (Rousseau, 1997).The key questions at the centre of my proposed research are: what are the elements of Grotius's constitutional theory? Can he appropriately be called a constitutional theorist? What are his contributions to constitutional thought? What can his constitutional theory tell us about the relationship between his civil philosophy and his international thought? Can we reappraise Grotius's position on the map of the history of political thought and dismiss the accusations of absolutism?Methodologically, my research will follow a sustained textual analysis of Grotius's texts to uncover and examine his constitutional theory, as well as engaging with his own interlocutors. Although I envision the analysis primarily to focus on his Rights of War and Peace, I also expect the scope to encompass other texts including Law of Prize and Booty, his historical works, and his early tracts.Interest in Grotius's constitutionalist credentials is burgeoning. For example, Daniel Lee (2016: 272) has demonstrated how Grotius's use of the Roman legal concept of usufruct has linked him to a 'broader juristic pattern of thought that has facilitated the introduction of a distinctively modern school of constitutionalism'; Marco Barducci (2017) has emphasised the employment of Grotius in the constitutional debates of the English Civil War, also echoed by Straumann (2015); Nehal Bhuta (2021) has advanced Grotius's 'modern' state theory, and Gustaaf van Nifterik (2018) has appraised a variety of interpretations of Grotius's constitutional thought. Yet, these studies do not go so far as to reconstruct a comprehensive understanding of Grotius's constitutional system. Thus, I think a systematic account of Grotian constitutionalism remains wanting.My treatment will offer four contributions to the current literature. First, it will develop our insights into Grotius's civil philosophy and allow us to consider it as an integral piece of his thought, not a mere building block for his international theory. Second, it will enhance our understanding of the Grotian project by demonstrating consistencies between his civil and international thought. Third, it will enrich the intellectual history of constitutionalism by probing and developing the connections made by Lee (2016), for example, between Grotius and ancient, medieval, and modern iterations. Fourth, it will speak to a perennial question of political theory, namely that concerning the basis and extent of political obligation owed to the sovereign authority.