Grotian constitutionalism: Legitimacy and limits in the civil thought of Hugo Grotius

雨果·格劳秀斯在政治和法律思想史上占有重要地位；他以国际法和自然法的“双重父亲”而闻名（Edwards, 1981: 9）。然而，我希望通过探讨他的公民哲学来揭示和审视他思想的宪法方面。我认为这项研究背后的推动力是格劳秀斯作为国际理论家和公民哲学家之间的文献不协调：格劳秀斯作为国际理论家，被认为是人道主义干预的支持者；而公民哲学家格劳秀斯则被描述为同情暴君（卢梭，1997）。我提出的研究中心的关键问题是：格劳秀斯的宪法理论的要素是什么？他能被恰当地称为宪法理论家吗？他对宪法思想的贡献是什么？他的宪法理论对他的公民哲学和国际思想之间的关系有什么启示？我们能否重新评价格劳秀斯在政治思想史地图上的地位，并摒弃对专制主义的指责？在方法论上，我的研究将遵循对格劳秀斯文本的持续文本分析，以揭示和检查他的宪法理论，以及与他自己的对话者接触。虽然我设想的分析主要集中在他的《战争与和平的权利》上，但我也希望分析的范围涵盖其他文本，包括《奖赏与战利品法》、他的历史著作和他的早期小册子。人们对格劳秀斯的立宪主义者资格越来越感兴趣。例如，Daniel Lee（2016: 272）证明了格劳秀斯对罗马法律用益权概念的使用如何将他与“更广泛的法律思维模式联系起来，这种思维模式促进了独特的现代宪政学派的引入”；Marco Barducci（2017）强调了格劳秀斯在英国内战宪法辩论中的运用，Straumann（2015）也对此表示赞同；Nehal Bhuta（2021）提出了格劳秀斯的“现代”国家理论，Gustaaf van Nifterik（2018）评价了对格劳秀斯宪法思想的各种解释。然而，这些研究并没有走到重建对格劳秀斯宪法体系的全面理解的地步。因此，我认为对格罗修斯立宪主义的系统描述仍然是缺乏的。我的论述将为当前的文献提供四个方面的贡献。首先，它将发展我们对格劳秀斯公民哲学的见解，并允许我们将其视为他思想的一个组成部分，而不仅仅是他的国际理论的一个组成部分。其次，通过展示他的民间思想与国际思想的一致性，加深我们对格罗田项目的理解。第三，通过探索和发展Lee（2016）所建立的联系，例如，格劳秀斯与古代、中世纪和现代迭代之间的联系，它将丰富宪政的思想史。第四，它将谈到一个政治理论的长期问题，即关于对主权当局的政治义务的基础和程度。

Hugo Grotius holds a prominent place in the history of political and legal thought; he is known for his 'dual paternity' of both international and natural law (Edwards, 1981: 9). However, I wish to explore his civil philosophy to uncover and examine the constitutional aspects of his thinking. The impetus behind this research is what I perceive to be a dissonance in the literature between Grotius as an internationaltheorist and as a civil philosopher: Grotius, the international theorist, is presented as a proponent of humanitarian intervention; whereas Grotius, the civil philosopher, is depicted as being sympathetic to tyrants (Rousseau, 1997).The key questions at the centre of my proposed research are: what are the elements of Grotius's constitutional theory? Can he appropriately be called a constitutional theorist? What are his contributions to constitutional thought? What can his constitutional theory tell us about the relationship between his civil philosophy and his international thought? Can we reappraise Grotius's position on the map of the history of political thought and dismiss the accusations of absolutism?Methodologically, my research will follow a sustained textual analysis of Grotius's texts to uncover and examine his constitutional theory, as well as engaging with his own interlocutors. Although I envision the analysis primarily to focus on his Rights of War and Peace, I also expect the scope to encompass other texts including Law of Prize and Booty, his historical works, and his early tracts.Interest in Grotius's constitutionalist credentials is burgeoning. For example, Daniel Lee (2016: 272) has demonstrated how Grotius's use of the Roman legal concept of usufruct has linked him to a 'broader juristic pattern of thought that has facilitated the introduction of a distinctively modern school of constitutionalism'; Marco Barducci (2017) has emphasised the employment of Grotius in the constitutional debates of the English Civil War, also echoed by Straumann (2015); Nehal Bhuta (2021) has advanced Grotius's 'modern' state theory, and Gustaaf van Nifterik (2018) has appraised a variety of interpretations of Grotius's constitutional thought. Yet, these studies do not go so far as to reconstruct a comprehensive understanding of Grotius's constitutional system. Thus, I think a systematic account of Grotian constitutionalism remains wanting.My treatment will offer four contributions to the current literature. First, it will develop our insights into Grotius's civil philosophy and allow us to consider it as an integral piece of his thought, not a mere building block for his international theory. Second, it will enhance our understanding of the Grotian project by demonstrating consistencies between his civil and international thought. Third, it will enrich the intellectual history of constitutionalism by probing and developing the connections made by Lee (2016), for example, between Grotius and ancient, medieval, and modern iterations. Fourth, it will speak to a perennial question of political theory, namely that concerning the basis and extent of political obligation owed to the sovereign authority.