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Vulnerability & The Other Non-Human Animal: a Phenomenological Approach to Animal Ethics

漏洞

基本信息

批准号：
2906707
负责人：
金额：
--
依托单位：
University of Sheffield
依托单位国家：
英国
项目类别：
Studentship
财政年份：
2024
资助国家：
英国
起止时间：
2024 至无数据
项目状态：
未结题

来源：
https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=studentship-2906707
关键词：
Vulnerability Other Non Human Animal

项目摘要

This project uses the phenomenological approach offered by Levinas(1981) and Logstrup(2020) to address the question of animal ethics. Most current accounts of animal ethics in the Western tradition ground morality on a being's capabilities. This approach is the capabilities approach and is defended by a wide range of philosophers (Nussbaum (2006), Palmer (2010), Bendik-Keymer (2014), Korsgaard (2018), Irvin (2004)). While all theorists agree that moral considerability is tied to an animal's possession of certain capabilities, they all disagree on the set of capabilities. This conceptual disagreement hints at a wider problem generated by the capabilities approach, i.e., its incapacity to account for the moral worth of less cognitively developed beings such as mentally disabled humans and non-human animals.This thesis aims to relocate ethics at the level of the encounter with an Other. I shall argue that a phenomenological approach to animal ethics is best suited to solve the problems generated by capabilities models because it views ethics as arising out of a being's vulnerability. Phenomenology is the study of the first-person experience of beings in the world. I will use the phenomenological approaches of Levinas and Logstrup to explore the ethical dimension arising during a being's interaction with another being. I will argue that the embodied presence of a non-human animal facing a human being creates a demand on the latter. What Logstrup calls the 'Ethical Demand' is the one-sided and silent request the Other makes on the One by exposing their vulnerability to them. This demand is prior to any convention and can only be heard by the One who becomes morally responsible for the Other. Ethics is not the product of capabilities, but is rather the pre-conceptual weight of being confronted to another living creature which has infinite needs that need to be fulfilled.

该项目使用Levinas（1981）和Logstrup（2020）提供的现象学方法来解决动物伦理问题。在西方传统中，大多数关于动物伦理的当前描述都将道德建立在一个人的能力之上。这种方法是能力方法，并得到了广泛的哲学家的辩护（Nussbaum（2006），Palmer（2010），Bendik-Keymer（2014），Korsgaard（2018），Irvin（2004））。虽然所有的理论家都同意道德的可接受性与动物拥有的某些能力有关，但他们都不同意能力的集合。这种概念上的分歧暗示了能力方法产生的一个更广泛的问题，即，它无法解释的道德价值的认知欠发达的存在，如精神残疾的人类和非人类动物。本论文旨在重新定位的伦理学的水平，与他者的遭遇。我认为，动物伦理学的现象学方法是最适合解决能力模型所产生的问题，因为它认为伦理作为一个正在出现的脆弱性。现象学是对世界上存在的第一人称经验的研究。我将使用列维纳斯和洛格斯特鲁普的现象学方法来探讨一个存在与另一个存在的互动过程中产生的伦理维度。我认为，非人类动物面对人类的具体存在创造了对后者的需求。Logstrup所谓的“道德需求”是他者通过向他们暴露自己的脆弱性而对他们提出的单方面和无声的要求。这个要求先于任何惯例，只有在道德上对他者负责的人才能听到。道德不是能力的产物，而是面对另一个有无限需要的生物的前概念重量。