Assertion, Practical Reasoning and Knowledge

断言、实践推理和知识

• 批准号: AH/E503772/1
• 负责人: Jessica Brown
• 金额: $ 3.4万
• 依托单位: University of St Andrews
• 依托单位国家: 英国
• 项目类别: Research Grant
• 财政年份: 2008
• 资助国家: 英国
• 起止时间: 2008 至 无数据
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=AH%2FE503772%2F1
• 关键词: Assertion; Practical; Reasoning; Knowledge

The project focuses on two human activities, namely assertion and reasoning about what to do, or 'practical reasoning'. An assertion, e.g. 'The boss is bald' may be criticised in a variety of ways, e.g. as rude or impolitic. Similarly, a piece of reasoning about what to do may be criticised as immoral or imprudent. Both an assertion and a piece of practical reasoning may be further criticised on the ground that one did not have enough evidence to assert the claim in question or to rely on it in one's practical reasoning. For instance, a policeman in charge of a murder inquiry would be rightly criticised for asserting that the assailant was male without sufficient evidence; similarly, he would be criticised for relying on that assumption in making an arrest, if he lacked sufficient evidence for it. What, then, are the epistemic standards for assertion or practical reasoning?Leading proponents of a wide variety of contemporary accounts of knowledge assume that knowledge is the common standard of assertion and practical reasoning (e.g. DeRose, Hawthorne, Stanley, and Williamson). They point out that an assertion; such as the claim 'It'll rain tomorrow' may be appropriately challenged by the question 'how do you know that?' Further, they point out that there's something paradoxical about simultaneously asserting a claim and saying that one does not know it, as in 'It is raining, but I don't know that'. This suggests that one should assert a claim only if one knows it. Turning to practical reasoning, they claim that it is intuitive that one should rely on an assumption in reasoning about what to do only if one knows it to be true. However, at best, these points show that one should assert p or practically reason from p only if one knows that p. They do not establish the further claim m 'de by some proponents of the knowledge standard that if one knows that p, then one is in a good enough economic position to assert that p or practically reason from p (e.g. Hawthorne; see also DeRose on assertion and Williamson on practical reasoning). Further, the case presented is partly intuitive. It would be preferable to move beyond this intuitive defense to a theoretical argument for the knowledge standard. The project will provide a detailed examination of the epistemic standards for assertion and practical reasoning. In particular, I will investigate whether there are different epistemic standards for assertion and practical reasoning, or a single standard common to both; whether the standard(s) is constant across different contexts; and whether the relevant standard is knowledge.The investigation will cast new light on contemporary philosophical debate between Contextualists and invariantists about the correct account of knowledge. A key issue concerns which of these views best reflects the supposed links between knowledge, assertion and practical reasoning. To see the contrast between the positions, consider the fact that, in a casual conversation one would be credited with knowledge on a more slender basis than in other contexts, such as a courtroom or a scientific meeting. E.g., the level of evidence required to count as knowing that one's colleague was in London yesterday is lower in casual conversation than in a murder inquiry. Contextualists claim that the standards for knowledge are different in different contexts; the higher the stakes, the more evidence one need's to be credited with knowledge. On this view it may be true for me to say 'I know my colleague was in London yesterday' in the department but not the police station. By contrast, invariantists claim that the standards for knowledge do not vary across context, so they must choose between the various standards, condemning those of ordinary life or the police investigation. The debate between Contextualists and invariantists is complex and subtle. Examining the epistemic standards for assertion and practical reasoning will help us determine which view is correct.

该项目的重点是两个人类活动，即断言和推理做什么，或“实践推理”。一个断言，例如“老板是秃头”，可能会受到各种各样的批评，例如粗鲁或不明智。同样，一段关于该做什么的推理可能会被批评为不道德或轻率。一个断言和一个实践推理都可能受到进一步的批评，理由是没有足够的证据来断言所讨论的主张或在实践推理中依赖它。例如，一名负责谋杀案调查的警察如果在没有足够证据的情况下断言袭击者是男性，就会受到正确的批评;同样，如果他缺乏足够的证据，他也会受到批评，因为他在逮捕时依赖于这一假设。那么，断言或实践推理的认识标准是什么？当代各种知识解释的主要支持者都认为知识是断言和实践推理的共同标准（例如DeRose、霍桑、斯坦利和威廉姆森）。他们指出，一个断言，如“明天会下雨”，可能会受到“你怎么知道的？”这个问题的适当挑战。此外，他们还指出，在声称一个主张的同时又说自己不知道，这是自相矛盾的，就像“下雨了，但我不知道”一样。这意味着只有当一个人知道一个主张时才应该断言它。转向实践推理，他们声称，只有当一个人知道它是真的时，他才应该依靠一个假设来推理该做什么，这是直觉的。然而，这些观点充其量表明，只有当人们知道p时，人们才应该断言p或实际上从p进行推理。它们并没有建立知识标准的一些支持者的进一步主张，即如果人们知道p，那么人们就处于足够好的经济地位，可以断言p或实际上从p进行推理（例如，霍桑;也见德罗斯关于断言和威廉姆森关于实践推理）。此外，所提出的情况是部分直观的。最好是超越这种直观的辩护，从理论上论证知识标准。该项目将详细审查断言和实践推理的认识标准。特别是，我将研究断言和实践推理是否有不同的认识标准，或者两者都有一个共同的标准;这些标准在不同的语境中是否是恒定的;以及相关的标准是否是知识。一个关键的问题是，这些观点中哪一种最能反映知识、断言和实践推理之间的假定联系。为了理解这两种立场之间的对比，我们可以考虑这样一个事实，即在随意的谈话中，人们会比在法庭或科学会议等其他场合更容易获得知识。例如，在一个示例中，要想知道同事昨天在伦敦，所需的证据水平在随意交谈中比在谋杀调查中要低。语境主义者声称，在不同的语境中，知识的标准是不同的;赌注越高，就需要更多的证据来证明知识。根据这种观点，我可以说“我知道我的同事昨天在伦敦”，但不是在警察局。相比之下，不变论者声称，知识的标准不会因背景而异，因此他们必须在各种标准之间做出选择，谴责那些普通生活或警察调查的标准。语境论者和不变论者之间的争论是复杂而微妙的。检查断言和实践推理的认识标准将有助于我们确定哪种观点是正确的。

项目成果

THE KNOWLEDGE NORM FOR ASSERTION

断言的知识规范

• DOI: 10.1111/j.1533-6077.2008.00139.x
• 发表时间: 2010
• 期刊: Philosophical Issues
• 影响因子: 0.7
• 作者: Brown J

Knowledge and Practical Reason

知识与实践理性

• 发表时间: 2008
• 期刊: Philosophy Compass
• 影响因子: 1.8
• 作者: Brown Jessica

Knowledge and Assertion

• DOI: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00369.x
• 发表时间: 2010-11-01
• 期刊: PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH
• 影响因子: 1.5
• 作者: Brown, Jessica

Assertion and Practical Reasoning: Common or Divergent Epistemic Standards?

• DOI: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00432.x
• 发表时间: 2012-01-01
• 期刊: PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH
• 影响因子: 1.5
• 作者: Brown, Jessica