Intuitions and Philosophical Methodology

直觉和哲学方法论

• 批准号: AH/F010559/1
• 负责人: Jessica Brown
• 金额: $ 102.07万
• 依托单位: University of St Andrews
• 依托单位国家: 英国
• 项目类别: Research Grant
• 财政年份: 2008
• 资助国家: 英国
• 起止时间: 2008 至 无数据
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=AH%2FF010559%2F1
• 关键词: Intuitions; Philosophical; Methodology

Intuitions and Philosophical Methodology will study and evaluate the methods contemporary philosophers as a matter fact employ. It is a project about how philosophy is and should be done. Our primary focus is on the ways in which philosophers appeal to 'intuitions' and use thought-experiments. A standard procedure in philosophy is the following: Some philosophical concept, C, is under discussion. We are presented with a thought experiment in which a scenario, S, is imagined, and we are asked to have intuitions about whether C is instantiated in S. This kind of procedure is at the centre of the some of the most important arguments in philosophy of language, mind, logic, metaphysics, and ethics. For example, in Gettier's famous argument against the so-called 'justified true belief theory of knowledge' we are asked us to imagine someone who has justified true belief that p, but, intuitively, doesn't know that p. That we have this intuition is taken to be very strong evidence that the justified-true-belief theory is false. Any systematic investigation of the methodological issues raised by such examples must give centre stage to two basic questions: 1. What is a philosophical intuition? 2. What role(s) do and should intuition play in philosophical methodology? Satisfactory answers to these questions are crucial to our understanding of what philosophy is, should be, and can be. It is not unthinkable that a rejection of this methodology might even jeopardise the entire enterprise of analytic philosophy as currently practiced. The project is organized into four phases. In Phase One we examine in depth a range of central examples of the method from a variety of areas of philosophy, including epistemology, philosophy of language and mind, logic, and metaphysics. In Phase Two we develop and evaluate models of intuition that systematise the details reviewed in Phase One. Phase Three is concerned with three sceptical challenges to the use of intuitions in philosophy. We ask, first, why philosophers think that a mere intuition that p provides any kind of reliable indication of the truth of p? Second, given that so much philosophical argument results in an intractable conflict of intuitions, how can philosophical intuition be any kind of source of philosophical knowledge? Finally, given that intuitions seem particularly prone to be influenced by contingent cultural and historical factors, why take intuitions to be more than a reflection of our historically local prejudices? The final phase of the project turns to a detailed case study. We apply lessons learned and frameworks developed in earlier phases to study a major issue at the intersection of philosophy of language and epistemology. Many epistemologist are proposing to adopt what has been called the 'New Linguistic Turn' (NLT) according to which the semantics for epistemically central concepts like 'knowledge', 'justification' and 'rationality' are based on appeals to intuitions about what speakers would say in various epistemic settings. Our goal will be to evaluate this proposal in the light of what has been learned about philosophical methodology in the first three phases.

直觉和哲学方法论将研究和评价当代哲学家作为事实所采用的方法。这是一个关于哲学是如何以及应该如何做的项目。我们的主要关注点是哲学家求助于“直觉”和使用思维实验的方式。哲学中的一个标准程序是这样的：一些哲学概念C正在讨论中。我们被呈现在一个思维实验中，在这个实验中，我们想象了一个场景，S，我们被要求对C是否在S中实例化有直觉。这种过程是语言哲学、思维哲学、逻辑哲学、形而上学和伦理学中一些最重要的争论的中心。例如，在格蒂尔著名的反对所谓的知识真信仰论的论点中，我们被要求想象一个人，他证明了真信仰p是正确的，但直觉上不知道p。我们有这个直觉被认为是合理真信念理论是错误的非常有力的证据。任何对这些例子所提出的方法论问题的系统研究都必须以两个基本问题为中心：1.什么是哲学直觉？2.(S)直觉在哲学方法论中扮演什么角色？对这些问题的满意回答对于我们理解什么是哲学、应该是什么、可以是什么是至关重要的。拒绝这种方法论甚至可能危及目前实践的分析哲学的整个事业，这并不是不可想象的。该项目分为四个阶段。在第一阶段，我们从哲学的各个领域，包括认识论、语言和心灵哲学、逻辑和形而上学，深入研究该方法的一系列核心例子。在第二阶段，我们开发和评估直觉模型，将第一阶段复习的细节系统化。第三阶段涉及在哲学中使用直觉的三个怀疑性挑战。我们问，首先，为什么哲学家们认为，仅仅凭直觉，p就能提供p真理的可靠指示？其次，鉴于如此多的哲学争论导致了难以解决的直觉冲突，哲学直觉怎么可能成为哲学知识的任何来源？最后，鉴于直觉似乎特别容易受到偶然的文化和历史因素的影响，为什么要认为直觉不仅仅是我们历史上本地偏见的反映？该项目的最后阶段将转向详细的案例研究。我们应用在早期阶段中学到的经验教训和建立的框架来研究语言哲学和认识论交汇处的一个主要问题。许多认识论学者提议采用所谓的“新语言学转向”(NLT)，根据这一理论，“知识”、“理由”和“理性”等认识论核心概念的语义是基于对说话人在各种认知环境中所说的话的直觉的呼吁。我们的目标将是根据在前三个阶段所学到的哲学方法论来评估这项建议。

项目成果

Intuitions, evidence and hopefulness

直觉、证据和希望

• DOI: 10.1007/s11229-011-9952-2
• 发表时间: 2011
• 期刊: Synthese
• 影响因子: 1.5
• 作者: Brown J

Shifty talk: knowledge and causation

狡猾的谈话：知识与因果关系

• DOI: 10.1007/s11098-012-0054-x
• 发表时间: 2012
• 期刊: Philosophical Studies
• 影响因子: 1.3
• 作者: Brown J

The Gettier Problem

盖蒂尔问题

• 作者: Brown Jessica

Experimental Philosophy, Contextualism and SSI

实验哲学、情境主义和 SSI

• DOI: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00461.x
• 发表时间: 2011
• 期刊: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
• 影响因子: 1.5
• 作者: Brown J

Seemings and Justification - New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism

表面与正当性——关于教条主义与现象保守主义的新论文

• DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199899494.003.0004
• 发表时间: 2013
• 作者: Brown J