Maternal and Child Health in Poor Countries: Evidence from Randomized Evaluations

贫穷国家的妇幼健康：随机评估的证据

• 批准号: 8687498
• 负责人: ESTHER DUFLO
• 金额: $ 79.05万
• 依托单位: MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 财政年份: 2010
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2010-09-25 至 2017-05-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://reporter.nih.gov/project-details/8687498
• 关键词: Bangladesh; Beds; Catastrophic Health Insurance; Child; Client; Communities; Country; Economics; Education; Evaluation; Fostering; Goals; Government Programs; Grant; Health; Health Services; Health Services Accessibility; Health education; Hospitals; Household; Incentives; India; Indonesia; Insecticides; Insurance; Intervention; Life; Marketing; Marriage; Marriage Ages; Maternal and Child Health; Measures; Methodology; Mothers; Outcome; Outcome Study; Performance; Price; Randomized; Research; Resources; Running; Scheme; Shock; Social Welfare; Societies; Solutions; Training; Water Purification; Woman; cost effective; empowerment; experience; financial incentive; health care delivery; improved; novel strategies; programs; research study; social; young woman

DESCRIPTION (provided by applicant): The poor health outcomes experienced by mothers and children in the developing world have been well known for decades, but practical, society-wide solutions remain elusive. By evaluating projects that seek to improve health through different channels in diverse contexts, this research program seeks to identify four such solutions. These projects are united not only by their goals, but in their rigorous methodology: controlled experiments of social programs. Project I examines the causal effect of fundamental drivers of demand for health services in Bangladesh. This project will trace the causal impact of education, age at marriage, and women's control over resources on women and children's outcomes by studying the long run implications of a program with three main parts: incentives to delay marriage, education support, and livelihood training. Project II assesses whether village-level incentive can foster collective action to improve demand for and access to health services. It examines the impact of a government program in Indonesia, Generasi, under which villages receive an annual block grant conditional on the village's performance on each of the 12 targeted health and education indicators. Project III examines how corruption can be controlled when subsidizing health product in a context of low demand. It will evaluate the impact of prices on the take up and usage of free insecticide treated bed nets and water purification kits and examine the impact of prices on corruption. It will then evaluate three interventions to reduce this corruption: auditing; market competition, and community empowerment. Project IV examines the impact of a catastrophic health insurance scheme offered by a microfinance organization to its clients in India, which covers hospital delivery. The project will study the impact of this program on the take up of institutional delivery, and on the impact of health shocks on household economic welfare. It will compare the impact of this program with that of a government program that gives women financial incentives for institutional delivery.

描述（由申请人提供）：数十年来，发展中国家的母亲和儿童经历的健康状况不佳，但实际，整个社会的解决方案仍然难以捉摸。通过评估试图通过不同环境中不同渠道改善健康的项目，该研究计划旨在识别四种这样的解决方案。这些项目不仅是由他们的目标，而且是由他们严格的方法论结合在一起的：社会计划的受控实验。项目I研究了孟加拉国对卫生服务需求的基本驱动力的因果关系。该项目将通过研究具有三个主要部分的计划的长期影响：延迟婚姻，教育支持和谋生培训的计划的长期影响，从而追溯教育，婚姻年龄以及妇女对资源对妇女和儿童成果的控制的因果影响。 II项目评估乡村级的激励措施是否可以促进集体行动，以改善对卫生服务的需求和获得。它研究了政府计划在印度尼西亚属的属性的影响，根据该计划，村庄在该村庄的年度赠款中获得了该村庄在12个有针对性的健康和教育指标中的表现的条件。 III项目研究了在需求低的情况下补贴健康产品时如何控制腐败。它将评估价格对自由杀虫剂处理的床网和水净化工具包的影响和使用的影响，并检查价格对腐败的影响。然后，它将评估三种干预措施以减少这种腐败：审计；市场竞争和社区授权。 IV项目研究了小额信贷组织向印度客户提供的灾难性健康保险计划的影响，该计划涵盖了医院的分娩。该项目将研究该计划对机构交付的影响以及健康冲击对家庭经济福利的影响。它将将该计划的影响与政府计划的影响相提并论，该计划为妇女提供了用于机构交付的经济激励措施。

项目成果

SHORT-RUN SUBSIDIES AND LONG-RUN ADOPTION OF NEW HEALTH PRODUCTS: EVIDENCE FROM A FIELD EXPERIMENT.

• DOI: 10.3982/ecta9508
• 发表时间: 2014-01
• 期刊: Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society
• 作者: Dupas P

Social science. Promoting transparency in social science research.

• DOI: 10.1126/science.1245317
• 发表时间: 2014-01-03
• 期刊: Science (New York, N.Y.)
• 作者: Miguel E;Camerer C;Casey K;Cohen J;Esterling KM;Gerber A;Glennerster R;Green DP;Humphreys M;Imbens G;Laitin D;Madon T;Nelson L;Nosek BA;Petersen M;Sedlmayr R;Simmons JP;Simonsohn U;Van der Laan M
• 通讯作者: Van der Laan M

Targeting health subsidies through a nonprice mechanism: A randomized controlled trial in Kenya.

• DOI: 10.1126/science.aaf6288
• 发表时间: 2016-08-26
• 期刊: Science (New York, N.Y.)
• 作者: Dupas P;Hoffmann V;Kremer M;Zwane AP
• 通讯作者: Zwane AP

Should Aid Reward Performance?: Evidence from a Field Experiment on Health and Education in Indonesia.

• DOI: 10.1257/app.6.4.1
• 发表时间: 2014-10
• 期刊: American economic journal. Applied economics
• 作者: Olken BA;Onishi J;Wong S
• 通讯作者: Wong S

Targeting the Poor: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia.

• DOI: 10.1257/aer.102.4.1206
• 发表时间: 2012-06
• 期刊: The American economic review
• 作者: Alatas V;Banerjee A;Hanna R;Olken BA;Tobias J
• 通讯作者: Tobias J