Secure Telecommunication Infrastructures - Mechanisms to mitigate the impacts of non-cooperative participants in distributed systems

我为人人，人人为我。分布式系统通常由独立的参与者组成，这些参与者必须为了自己的利益而相互协作。如果参与者之间没有强有力的合作，这些制度将是无效的。不幸的是，参与者合法合作、恶意行为或行为自私。例如，在移动自组织网络中，参与者可能不得不转发来自其他人的流量。因此，自私的参与者可以被视为被动的参与者，他们从他人那里获取一些网络服务，而不提供任何此类服务。这些参与者可能会对此类网络的性能产生重大影响。最终，合法的参与者可能无法正常沟通。 如果没有任何激励机制，自私的参与者就会为了自己的利益而行事，而不考虑他人。传统上，博弈论一直被用来建立激励机制的模型，用伪造的货币奖励合法参与者。重复的非合作博弈方法也可以用来迫使自私的参与者在潜在报复的威胁下进行合作。 不幸的是，传统的方法假设合作参与者总是能够诚实地合作。它们不能轻松应对随机参与者，不幸的是，这些参与者无法立即进行协作。类似地，传统的方法假设合作和不合作的参与者总是可以正确地区分出来。如果一名参与者认错了另一名参与者，后者可能会面临无理的报复。本研究计划将探讨如何采用博弈论的经典方法(I)允许随机合作参与者的存在和(Ii)处理合作/非合作参与者的错误识别。

One for all, all for one. Distributed systems are generally composed of independent participants who have to collaborate with each other for their own benefit. Without a strong cooperation among the participants, these systems would be ineffective. Unfortunately, participants cooperate legitimately, act maliciously or behave selfishly. For example, in mobile ad hoc networks, the participants may have to forward traffic flows from others. Thus, selfish participants can be seen as passive participants who retrieve some network services from others without providing back any such service. These participants can have major impacts on the performance of such a network. Ultimately, legitimate participants may not be able to communicate properly. Without any incentive mechanism, selfish participants would behave for their own benefit without any regard for others. Traditionally, game theory has been used to model incentive mechanisms to reward legitimate participants with a faked currency. Repeated non-cooperative game approaches can also be used to force selfish participants to collaborate under the threat of potential retaliation. Unfortunately, traditional approaches assume that cooperative participants can always collaborate truthfully. They cannot cope easily with stochastic participants who are unfortunately unable to collaborate momentarily. Similarly, traditional approaches assume that cooperative and uncooperative participants can always be distinguished without any error. If a participant misidentifies another participant, this latter participant may be facing unjustifiable retaliations. This research program would investigate how to adapt the classical approaches of game theory (i) to allow the presence of stochastic cooperative participants and (ii) to cope with misidentification of the cooperative/uncooperative participants.