Competition, collaboration, and control of decision rights in supply chains

多公司供应链的管理、协调和设计是工业工程师、运营和供应链经理以及经济学家感兴趣的话题。传统上，这一领域的研究集中在运营决策的最优控制，如供应链中的库存管理。 所使用的方法在很大程度上依赖于优化理论。 在过去的十年中，新的研究通过纳入激励问题来充实这一文献。 这种额外的关注得到了博弈论的支持，并认识到所有供应链都由多个独立的决策者组成，每个决策者都能最大化自己的利益。 这两种方法都有助于识别和消除供应链的低效率，但每一种方法都隐含地假设供应链的结构是预先确定的;要么存在一个集中的决策者，要么存在多个决策者。 此外，模型假设供应链决策的控制是预先确定的。 例如，在一个典型的供应链模型中，制造商向零售商销售产品，零售商做出库存决策，而制造商指定合同。 在现实中，供应链的结构和供应链决策权的分配本身就是决策变量。 在上面的例子中，企业可以选择垂直整合，从而将分散的供应链转变为集中的供应链。 即使供应链的结构没有改变，决策权的分配也可能会改变，例如，制造商可能会做出库存决策。 本NSERC研究提案将探讨与供应链结构相关的问题，以及这些链中决策权的分配。 具体来说，这里提出的研究将调查：1）谁拥有和控制供应链中的库存决策，为什么？2）谁控制供应链中的物流功能，这种控制的含义是什么？3）可以采取什么激励措施来鼓励供应链中的竞争对手合作？4）如何保持竞争对手之间的合作？

The management, coordination, and design of multi-firm supply chains are topics of interest to industrial engineers, operations and supply chain managers, and economists. Traditionally, research in this area has focused on the optimal control of operational decisions such as the management of inventories in a supply chain. The methodology used has relied heavily on optimization theory. In the last decade new research has augmented this literature by incorporating the issue of incentives. This additional focus is supported by game theory, and recognizes the fact that all supply chains consist of multiple independent decision makers and individual decision makers maximize their self-interest. Both approaches are important to help identify and eliminate supply chain inefficiencies but each implicitly assumes that the structure of the supply chain is predetermined; either a centralized decision maker exists, or multiple decision makers exist. In addition, the models assume that the control of supply chain decisions is predetermined. For example, in a typical supply chain model, a manufacturer sells a product to a retailer and the retailer makes the inventory decision while the manufacturer specifies the contract. In reality, the structure of the supply chain and the allocation of supply chain decision rights are themselves decision variables. In the above example, the firms may choose to vertically integrate thereby converting a decentralized supply chain to a centralized one. Even if the structure of the supply chain is unchanged, the allocation of decision rights may be modified and the manufacturer, for example, may be making the inventory decision. This NSERC research proposal will explore issues related to the structure of supply chains, and the allocation of decision rights in these chains. Specifically, the research proposed here will investigate: 1) who owns and controls inventory decisions in a supply chain, and why; 2) who controls the logistics function in a supply chain and what are the implications of this control; 3) what incentives can be put in place to encourage competitors in a supply chain to collaborate; and 4) how can collaboration be maintained among competitors?