Intuitive and Analytic Contributions to High-Level Cognition

对信息进行思考和分析推理的能力可以说是使人类认知独一无二的关键认知能力之一。然而，几十年的研究表明，我们经常无法在广泛的情况下分析思考问题，这可能会导致许多偏见。例如，人们在判断事件的概率时往往不考虑基本比率信息。此外，人们经常让他们的信念和期望来指导他们的判断，而不是合乎逻辑地评估信息。最近，这些发现在理论上被框定在双过程框架内，该框架假设大脑能够进行两种根本不同的过程：快速而直观的类型1过程和深思熟虑和分析的类型2过程。在这里，各种领域的成功推理和决策表现已经被证明依赖于分析过程(即，类型2)的参与程度。也许令人惊讶的是，我们仍然对是什么触发我们参与这一基本能力知之甚少。也就是说，关于是什么让人们“思考”，我们仍然知之甚少。在目前的提案中，我提出了三条实验路线，旨在为这一人类认知的基本问题提供新的见解。这些研究路线通过考察影响分析性思维倾向的更基本的认知机制和更高水平的元认知过程，提供了一个多管齐下的方法来解决这个问题。此外，通过纳入大量的个体差异变量(例如，自我报告和分析与直觉思维风格、认知能力、毅力和动机的绩效测量)，我的实验室将能够提供新的见解，了解驱动分析思维的机制的运作可能会随着个体差异而变化。在学术层面上，这些都是关键问题，因为当前人类推理和决策理论的有用性取决于它们预测分析过程何时以及如何进行的能力。具体地说，从这些研究中获得的数据将有助于开发一个更全面、更普遍适用的模型，即更基本的认知过程(例如，注意力)和高级过程(例如，元认知)如何相互作用，以影响一个人在推理和决策时对类型1与类型2的依赖。在更实际的层面上，通过对驱动分析思维的机制的洞察，并确定促进分析思维的条件，我的实验室将处于理想的地位，当分析推理可能有助于现实世界中的成功推理和决策时(例如，在医疗、经济和法律决策中)，我的实验室将处于开发促进分析推理的策略的理想地位。

The ability to think and reason analytically about information is arguably one of the key cognitive faculties that make human cognition unique. However, decades of research have shown that we often fail to think analytically about problems in a wide range of circumstances, which can lead to numerous biases. For example, people often fail to take into account base-rate information when judging the probability of events. In addition, people often let their beliefs and expectations guide their judgments, rather than logically evaluating information. Recently, these findings have been theoretically framed within a dual-process framework, which posits that the mind is capable of two fundamentally different types of processes: 'Type 1' processes that are fast and intuitive, and 'Type 2' processes that are deliberative and analytic. Here, successful reasoning and decision-making performance in a wide variety of domains has been shown to be dependent on the degree to which analytic processes (i.e., Type 2) are engaged. Perhaps surprisingly, we still know very little about what triggers us to engage this fundamental ability. That is, we still know very little about what makes people 'think'. In the current proposal, I propose three lines of experiments that aim to provide novel insights into this fundamental question of human cognition. These lines of research provide a multi-pronged approach to this problem by examining both the more basic cognitive mechanisms as well as the more high-level metacognitive processes that influence the propensity to think analytically. In addition, by incorporating numerous individual differences variables (e.g., self report and performance measures of analytic versus intuitive thinking styles, cognitive ability, perseverance, and motivation) my lab will be able to provide new insights into how the operation of the mechanisms driving analytic thinking might vary as a function of individual differences. At an academic level, these are key questions as the usefulness of current theories of human reasoning and decision-making rests on their ability to predict when and how analytic processes will be engaged. Specifically, the data obtained from these studies will enable the development of a more comprehensive and generally applicable model of how more basic cognitive processes (e.g., attention) and high-level processes (e.g., metacognition) interact to influence one's reliance on Type 1 versus Type 2 processes when reasoning and decision-making. At a more practical level, by gaining insights into the mechanisms that drive analytic thinking, and determining the conditions under which analytic thinking can be facilitated, my lab will be ideally positioned to develop strategies to facilitate analytic reasoning when it could be beneficial for successful reasoning and decision-making in the real world (e.g., in medical, economic, and legal decision-making).