Intuitive and Analytic Contributions to High-Level Cognition

对信息进行思考和分析推理的能力可以说是使人类认知独特的关键认知能力之一。然而，几十年的研究表明，我们经常不能在广泛的情况下分析思考问题，这可能导致许多偏见。例如，人们在判断事件发生的概率时，往往没有考虑到基本概率信息。此外，人们经常让他们的信念和期望指导他们的判断，而不是逻辑地评估信息。最近，这些发现在理论上被建立在一个双过程框架内，该框架假定大脑能够进行两种根本不同类型的过程：“第一类”过程是快速和直觉的，“第二类”过程是深思熟虑和分析的。在这里，成功的推理和决策表现在各种各样的领域已经被证明是依赖于分析过程（即，类型2）的参与程度。也许令人惊讶的是，我们仍然对是什么触发了我们使用这种基本能力知之甚少。也就是说，我们仍然对是什么让人们“思考”知之甚少。在目前的提案中，我提出了三条实验线，旨在为人类认知的这个基本问题提供新的见解。这些研究提供了一种多管齐下的方法来解决这个问题，既检查了更基本的认知机制，也检查了影响分析性思维倾向的更高级的元认知过程。此外，通过整合许多个体差异变量（例如，分析与直觉思维方式、认知能力、毅力和动机的自我报告和绩效测量），我的实验室将能够为驱动分析思维的机制运作如何作为个体差异的函数而变化提供新的见解。在学术层面上，这些都是关键问题，因为当前人类推理和决策理论的有用性取决于它们预测分析过程何时以及如何参与的能力。具体来说，从这些研究中获得的数据将有助于开发一个更全面、更普遍适用的模型，研究更基本的认知过程（如注意力）和高级认知过程（如元认知）如何相互作用，影响一个人在推理和决策时对1型和2型过程的依赖。在更实际的层面上，通过深入了解驱动分析思维的机制，并确定可以促进分析思维的条件，我的实验室将处于理想的位置，以制定策略来促进分析推理，当它可能有利于在现实世界中成功的推理和决策（例如，在医疗，经济和法律决策中）。

The ability to think and reason analytically about information is arguably one of the key cognitive faculties that make human cognition unique. However, decades of research have shown that we often fail to think analytically about problems in a wide range of circumstances, which can lead to numerous biases. For example, people often fail to take into account base-rate information when judging the probability of events. In addition, people often let their beliefs and expectations guide their judgments, rather than logically evaluating information. Recently, these findings have been theoretically framed within a dual-process framework, which posits that the mind is capable of two fundamentally different types of processes: 'Type 1' processes that are fast and intuitive, and 'Type 2' processes that are deliberative and analytic. Here, successful reasoning and decision-making performance in a wide variety of domains has been shown to be dependent on the degree to which analytic processes (i.e., Type 2) are engaged. Perhaps surprisingly, we still know very little about what triggers us to engage this fundamental ability. That is, we still know very little about what makes people 'think'. In the current proposal, I propose three lines of experiments that aim to provide novel insights into this fundamental question of human cognition. These lines of research provide a multi-pronged approach to this problem by examining both the more basic cognitive mechanisms as well as the more high-level metacognitive processes that influence the propensity to think analytically. In addition, by incorporating numerous individual differences variables (e.g., self report and performance measures of analytic versus intuitive thinking styles, cognitive ability, perseverance, and motivation) my lab will be able to provide new insights into how the operation of the mechanisms driving analytic thinking might vary as a function of individual differences. At an academic level, these are key questions as the usefulness of current theories of human reasoning and decision-making rests on their ability to predict when and how analytic processes will be engaged. Specifically, the data obtained from these studies will enable the development of a more comprehensive and generally applicable model of how more basic cognitive processes (e.g., attention) and high-level processes (e.g., metacognition) interact to influence one's reliance on Type 1 versus Type 2 processes when reasoning and decision-making. At a more practical level, by gaining insights into the mechanisms that drive analytic thinking, and determining the conditions under which analytic thinking can be facilitated, my lab will be ideally positioned to develop strategies to facilitate analytic reasoning when it could be beneficial for successful reasoning and decision-making in the real world (e.g., in medical, economic, and legal decision-making).