Intuitive and Analytic Contributions to High-Level Cognition

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The ability to think and reason analytically about information is arguably one of the key cognitive faculties that make human cognition unique. However, decades of research have shown that we often fail to think analytically about problems in a wide range of circumstances, which can lead to numerous biases. For example, people often fail to take into account base-rate information when judging the probability of events. In addition, people often let their beliefs and expectations guide their judgments, rather than logically evaluating information. Recently, these findings have been theoretically framed within a dual-process framework, which posits that the mind is capable of two fundamentally different types of processes: 'Type 1' processes that are fast and intuitive, and 'Type 2' processes that are deliberative and analytic. Here, successful reasoning and decision-making performance in a wide variety of domains has been shown to be dependent on the degree to which analytic processes (i.e., Type 2) are engaged. Perhaps surprisingly, we still know very little about what triggers us to engage this fundamental ability. That is, we still know very little about what makes people 'think'. In the current proposal, I propose three lines of experiments that aim to provide novel insights into this fundamental question of human cognition. These lines of research provide a multi-pronged approach to this problem by examining both the more basic cognitive mechanisms as well as the more high-level metacognitive processes that influence the propensity to think analytically. In addition, by incorporating numerous individual differences variables (e.g., self report and performance measures of analytic versus intuitive thinking styles, cognitive ability, perseverance, and motivation) my lab will be able to provide new insights into how the operation of the mechanisms driving analytic thinking might vary as a function of individual differences. At an academic level, these are key questions as the usefulness of current theories of human reasoning and decision-making rests on their ability to predict when and how analytic processes will be engaged. Specifically, the data obtained from these studies will enable the development of a more comprehensive and generally applicable model of how more basic cognitive processes (e.g., attention) and high-level processes (e.g., metacognition) interact to influence one's reliance on Type 1 versus Type 2 processes when reasoning and decision-making. At a more practical level, by gaining insights into the mechanisms that drive analytic thinking, and determining the conditions under which analytic thinking can be facilitated, my lab will be ideally positioned to develop strategies to facilitate analytic reasoning when it could be beneficial for successful reasoning and decision-making in the real world (e.g., in medical, economic, and legal decision-making).**