Methods and models to combat infiltration of fakes and adulterated products into the supply chain

打击假冒伪劣产品渗透到供应链的方法和模式 近年来，假冒和掺假(即有缺陷)的商品和食品的泛滥导致了死亡、产品故障和重大产品召回。我的研究项目的目标是使用运筹学的方法来帮助决策者对抗供应链中产品质量的下降。为此，我将开发三个相关的研究流，涉及优化、采用区块链技术的合作游戏方法以及带有人群报告的激励机制设计。 首先，我考虑的是中介机构的问题，例如医院或零售商。中介可以通过从信誉良好的主要来源(例如真正的制造商)购买任何数量的100%可靠的商品来补充其库存。如果主要来源变得不可用，并且没有其他信誉良好的主要来源，中介是否应该放弃其业务，或者转向替代供应商并面临收到假冒产品的风险？中介机构会对替代供应商提供的产品中假冒商品的比例有一个事先的信念。中介的问题包括测试以获得进一步的信息，并在得到保证的情况下决定从替代供应商那里订购多少台。 我的第二个目标涉及使用博弈论来激励食品供应链中全系统采用区块链技术。区块链适应提高了企业的食品可追溯性，并提高了消费者的供应链透明度。对于这个项目，我解决了以下五个主要问题。(I)随着更多的公司采用区块链技术，供应链范围的利润是否会增加？(Ii)在采用区块链技术带来的全供应链利润增长中，哪家公司扮演的角色最重要？(Iii)区块链技术的采用如何影响食品供应链中的需求以及批发定价和订单决策？(Iv)全系统采用区块链技术产生的总利润如何在三家公司之间公平分配？(V)如果我们使用合作博弈的方法来分配总利润，当没有公司采用区块链技术时，哪个公司获得的利润以上增量最大？ 作为我的最终目标，我将考虑将“追踪和追踪”等防伪技术与实施延期付款计划结合起来。然后，我将把延期付款计划与群众举报结合起来，了解在什么情况下检查机制比群众举报更可取，以及在线声誉论坛是否可以取代传统的检查机制。 我相信我提出的研究项目将有助于打击假冒伪劣产品渗透到供应链中，最终将使加拿大消费者受益。

Methods and models to combat infiltration of fakes and adulterated products into the supply chain In recent years the proliferation of fake and adulterated (i.e., defective) goods and food products has resulted in deaths, product failures and major product recalls. The objective of my research program is to use operations research methodology to help decision makers in combatting the degradation of the product quality in supply chains. To that end, I will develop three related streams of research involving optimization, cooperative game approach to blockchain technology adoption, and incentive mechanism design with crowd reporting. First, I consider the problem of an intermediary, e.g., a hospital or a retailer. The intermediary can replenish its inventory by purchasing 100% reliable goods in any amount from a reputable primary source, e.g., a genuine manufacturer. If the primary source becomes unavailable and there is no other reputable primary source, should the intermediary forgo its business, or turn to an alternate supplier and face the risk of receiving counterfeit products? The intermediary would have a prior belief about the fraction of counterfeit goods in the products supplied by the alternate supplier. The intermediary's problem involves testing to gain further information and, if warranted, deciding on how many units to order from the alternate supplier. My second objective involves using game theory to incentivize the system-wide adoption of blockchain technology in a food supply chain. Blockchain adaption raises food traceability for firms and improves supply chain transparency for consumers. For this project, I address the following five major questions. (i) Can the supply chain-wide profit increase as more firms adopt the blockchain technology? (ii) Which firm plays the most important role in the supply chain-wide profit increase with the adoption of blockchain technology? (iii) How does the adoption of blockchain technology impact the demand as well as the wholesale pricing and order decisions in the food supply chain? (iv) How is the total profit resulting from the system-wide adoption of blockchain technology fairly allocated among the three firms? (v) Which firm obtains the largest increment above his profit when no firm adopts the blockchain technology, if we use a cooperative game approach to allocate the total profit? As my final objective, I will consider combining anti-counterfeit technologies such as “Track and Trace,” with implementing deferred payment programs. I will then combine the deferred payment programs with crowd reporting to learn under what conditions would an inspection mechanism be preferable to crowd reporting, and if the online reputation forums can replace traditional inspection mechanisms. I believe the research projects I am proposing will help combat infiltration of fakes and adulterated products into the supply chain, and ultimately, will benefit the Canadian consumers.