Methods and models to combat infiltration of fakes and adulterated products into the supply chain

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Methods and models to combat infiltration of fakes and adulterated products into the supply chain In recent years the proliferation of fake and adulterated (i.e., defective) goods and food products has resulted in deaths, product failures and major product recalls. The objective of my research program is to use operations research methodology to help decision makers in combatting the degradation of the product quality in supply chains. To that end, I will develop three related streams of research involving optimization, cooperative game approach to blockchain technology adoption, and incentive mechanism design with crowd reporting. First, I consider the problem of an intermediary, e.g., a hospital or a retailer. The intermediary can replenish its inventory by purchasing 100% reliable goods in any amount from a reputable primary source, e.g., a genuine manufacturer. If the primary source becomes unavailable and there is no other reputable primary source, should the intermediary forgo its business, or turn to an alternate supplier and face the risk of receiving counterfeit products? The intermediary would have a prior belief about the fraction of counterfeit goods in the products supplied by the alternate supplier. The intermediary's problem involves testing to gain further information and, if warranted, deciding on how many units to order from the alternate supplier. My second objective involves using game theory to incentivize the system-wide adoption of blockchain technology in a food supply chain. Blockchain adaption raises food traceability for firms and improves supply chain transparency for consumers. For this project, I address the following five major questions. (i) Can the supply chain-wide profit increase as more firms adopt the blockchain technology? (ii) Which firm plays the most important role in the supply chain-wide profit increase with the adoption of blockchain technology? (iii) How does the adoption of blockchain technology impact the demand as well as the wholesale pricing and order decisions in the food supply chain? (iv) How is the total profit resulting from the system-wide adoption of blockchain technology fairly allocated among the three firms? (v) Which firm obtains the largest increment above his profit when no firm adopts the blockchain technology, if we use a cooperative game approach to allocate the total profit? As my final objective, I will consider combining anti-counterfeit technologies such as "Track and Trace," with implementing deferred payment programs. I will then combine the deferred payment programs with crowd reporting to learn under what conditions would an inspection mechanism be preferable to crowd reporting, and if the online reputation forums can replace traditional inspection mechanisms. I believe the research projects I am proposing will help combat infiltration of fakes and adulterated products into the supply chain, and ultimately, will benefit the Canadian consumers.