由于财政预算的限制，各国都面临着公共服务能力不足的问题，长时间等待成了公共服务系统的“标签”。我国作为一个人口大国，这一问题更为突出，而且随着人口结构逐渐老年化，情况将会变得更糟。为了应对这一问题，各国政府都在尝试各种运营策略。双轨制公共服务系统正是在实践中应用最为成功的策略。当民众具有延时敏感行为特征时，这一特征对双轨制公共服务系统的定价与能力规划起着非常重要的作用，也是造成交通领域中很有名的现象——“Downs—Thomas”悖论的重要原因。本项目拟结合博弈论和排队论，从民众延时敏感行为特征的视角，对当前我国双轨制公共服务系统定价与能力规划存在的热点问题展开研究。本项目的研究对于揭示双轨制公共服务系统价格的形成机制具有重要理论意义和学术价值，也为实践中诸如医疗、交通等公共服务系统的定价和能力规划提供理论基础和政策启示。

Due to the limitation of finance budget, the capacity of public service is insufficient all over the world. As a result, long delay and waiting line becomes “identification” of the public service. As the world's most populous country, China is facing even worse situation. To complicate matters further, it could be worse and worse with the aging of the population. To address the challenge, two-tier public service system was successfully adopted in practice. When people are delay sensitive, the behavior character of the people is the most important factor we should consider when setting the price and capacity of two-tier public service system. It is also the cause of famous phenomenon known as “Downs-Thomas” paradox. In the project, we will study the hotspot issues of two-tier public service system in China by using of game theorem and queueing theorem. Unlike the traditional research on the pricing and capacity planning of public service system, we focus on the behavior character of people, which is delay sensitivity. The aim of this project is to reveal the formation mechanism of pricing of two-tier public service system, and also to support the social planner to make decision on the price and capacity of two-tier public service system. Therefore, this research has both scientifical significances and application values.