Trade Policy with Imperfect Markets

对不确定性和不完全竞争的认识导致了对国际贸易和商业政策的经济理论的实质性反思。这个项目的目的是在四个广泛的领域扩大这项研究的前沿，这些领域的主题自然地从作者之前的工作中发展而来。答：贸易滞后：当企业必须支付进入和离开市场的成本时，短暂的货币失调会对进口量和价格产生持久的影响。以前对这一现象的模型过于简单化和不切实际。拟议中的研究对汇率变动(特别是布朗运动)有简单但更现实的描述。对于有竞争力的企业，已经取得了一些结果；未来的工作将包括不完全竞争，并审查相关的政策问题，如石油进口税。B.国际R&D竞争：由于R&D本质上是有风险的，所以对这一领域的政策进行良好的分析必须采用随机动态博弈模型。这样的模型已经形成；研究将包括求解该模型所需的大量数值计算。有关研发竞赛中的领先者和落后者适用的战略的强度和风险的假设将得到检验。将审查高技术产业贸易和补贴政策的设计。C.国际政策冲突与协调：要研究的主要问题是避免囚徒困境：对竞争性行业的标准关税报复性战争，以及对寡头垄断的战略性进口关税或出口补贴。课程将研究贸易政策多个层面上的囚徒困境，以及为分享贸易自由化的潜在好处而进行的讨价还价游戏。D.不确定条件下的贸易政策：汇集和分配风险的市场往往是不完整的，尤其是在最不发达国家。然而，主张对保险使用贸易限制的随意论调是站不住脚的。我们将研究市场失灵的更精确表述，以及适当的政策回应。

The recognition of uncertainty and imperfect competition has led to a substantial rethinking of the economic theory of international trade and commercial policy. This project aims to expand the frontiers of this research in four broad areas, the themes of which evolve naturally from the author's previous work. A. Hysteresis in Trade: When firms must incur costs to enter and leave a market, transient currency misalignments have persistent effects on import volumes and prices. Previous models of this phenomenon were oversimplified and unrealistic. The proposed research has simple but more realistic descriptions of exchange rate movements (notably Brownian motion). Some results for competitive firms have been obtained; future work will include imperfect competition, and examine related policy issues like oil import taxes. B. International R & D Competition: Since R & D is inherently risky, good analysis of policy in this area must employ a stochastic dynamic game model. Such a model is formulated; the research will consist of extensive numerical computations necessary to solve it. Hypotheses about the intensity and the riskiness of strategies appropriate for leaders and laggards in the R & D race will be tested. The design of trade and subsidy policy for high-tech industries will be examined. C. International Policy Conflict and Coordination: The main issue to be researched is the avoidance of Prisoner's Dilemmas: the standard tariff retaliation war for competitive industries, and the strategic import tariff or export subsidy for oligopolies. Prisoners' Dilemmas over many dimensions of trade policies, and games of bargaining to divide the potential gains from trade liberalization, will be studied. D. Trade Policy Under Uncertainty: Markets for pooling and allocating risk are often incomplete, especially in LDC's. However, casual arguments that advocate the use of trade restrictions for insurance do not survive rigorous analysis. More precise formulations of the market failures, and appropriate policy responses, will be studied.