Renegotiation and Bargaining in Dynamic Games

这个项目解决了战略动态理论中一个被忽视但至关重要的研究领域，即重复博弈中的重新谈判。重新谈判和讨价还价能力结合在一个统一、连贯的理论中。该项目的大部分内容是提供清晰的描述，使该理论在应用经济问题中易于处理。随着对更复杂的超级博弈的研究，适当定义的表述和表征都变得越来越具有挑战性。给出了非对称严格重复对策和一些动态随机对策的定义和猜想结果。这是一项极其重要的研究，因为它纠正了重复博弈模型的一个重大缺陷，重复博弈模型被广泛应用于宏观理论、产业组织、国际贸易等许多经济理论领域。重复博弈模型的有效性取决于参与者达成的协议的可信度。如果玩家认为他们可以通过在违反协议后重新谈判来逃避违反协议的惩罚，那么他们就不再有遵守协议的动机。因此，没有重新谈判理论的重复博弈模型是有缺陷的，因为可能会出现许多不同的结果，而不是达成一致的结果。

This project addresses a neglected but crucial area of research in the theory of strategic dynamics, i.e., renegotiation in repeated games. Renegotiation and bargaining power are combined in a unified, coherent theory. Much of the project is concerned with providing clean characterizations which make the theory tractable in applied economic problems. Both the formulation of the appropriate definitions and the characterizations become progressively more challenging as more complicated supergames are studied. The project gives definitions and conjectured results for asymmetric strictly repeated games and for some dynamic and stochastic games. This is extremely important research because it corrects a major flaw in models of repeated games and repeated game models are widely used in macro theory, industrial organization, international trade and many other areas of economic theory. The validity of repeated game models depend on the credibility of the agreements reached by the players. If players think they can escape punishment for violating agreements by renegotiating the agreement after they violate it, then they no longer have an incentive to abide by the agreements. Therefore, a model of repeated games without a theory of renegotiation is flawed because many different outcomes other than the one agreed upon are possible.