Collaborative Research in Experimental Studies of Auctions and Markets with Asymmetric Information

本项目扩展并完成了英国共同价值拍卖、非对称（内幕）信息共同价值拍卖以及实验拍卖市场学习过程的实验研究。该项目还完成了休斯顿建筑行业招标过程的案例研究。在之前的国家科学基金会资助下，调查人员发现了英国拍卖中存在“赢家诅咒”（中标者遭受损失）的确凿证据。这在方法论上是一个重要的结果，因为它与现有的竞价理论相矛盾，在实质上是重要的，因为英国共同价值拍卖是一种广泛使用的拍卖机制。实验采用了英国时钟程序，即价格从物品的最低可能价值开始，然后稳步上升。在表示有意退出拍卖之前，竞标者都是活跃的，而这一决定对于该物品的出售是不可撤销的。最后一个活跃的竞标者赢得该物品，并支付倒数第二个竞标者退出的价格。实验表明，落选者的退出价格向其他竞标者透露了信息，减少但不消除了赢家的诅咒。进一步的研究应该为减轻或完全消除拍卖中的赢家诅咒的制度和实践提供新的有用的见解。休斯顿建筑业的案例研究特别有趣。为了确定拍卖市场调查结果的普遍性，研究人员进行了一系列低价格，共同价值报价拍卖，以比较学生受试者与休斯顿建筑行业经验丰富的专业人员的表现。在不同的对象池中发现了性质相似的行为，因为在两种情况下，竞标者都遭受了赢家的诅咒，因为赢得物品而损失金钱，而增加竞标者的数量则加剧了损失。这些结果提出了一个重要的问题：为什么企业高管在现实世界的拍卖中成功，而在实验室拍卖中失败？该案例研究确定了一些现实世界的制度特征和实践，以减少赢家诅咒的影响。

This project extends and completes experimental investigations of English common value auctions, common value auctions with asymmetric (insider) information, and learning processes in experimental auction markets. The project also finishes a case study of the bidding process in the Houston construction industry. Under the previous NSF grant the investigators found conclusive evidence of a "winner's curse" (winning bidders suffer losses) in English auctions. This is an important result methodologically because it contradicts existing theories of bidding and it is important substantively since the English common value auction is a widely used mechanism for auctions. The experiments employed an English clock procedure whereby prices start at the lowest possible value for the item and increase steadily. Bidders are active until they signal their intention to drop out of the auction, which decision is irrevocable for the sale of that item. The last active bidder wins the item, paying the price at which the next to last bidder dropped out. The experiments demonstrated that the dropout prices of losing bidders reveal information to the other bidders and reduce but do not eliminate the winner's curse. Further research should provide new and useful insights into institutions and practices that mitigate or eliminate entirely the winner's curse in auctions. The case study of the construction industry in Houston is especially interesting. In order to determine the generalizability of the auction market findings, the investigators conducted a series of low price, common value offer auctions in comparing the performance of student subjects with experienced professionals from the Houston construction industry. Qualitatively similar behavior was found across subject pools as in both cases bidders suffered from the winner's curse, losing money as a consequence of winning the item, and increasing the number of bidders exacerbated the losses. These results raised an important question: Why are business executives successful in real world auctions and unsuccessful in laboratory auctions? The case study identifies a number of real world institutional features and practices that reduce the effects of the winner's curse.