Experimental Studies of Information Processing and Decision Making in Markets

本文提出了以不确定性和信息不对称为特征的工业市场中的管理决策研究实验：(1)现有企业可能试图通过战略性价格操纵限制进入的市场；(2)大型连锁商店可能试图通过建立强硬竞争对手的声誉来限制进入的市场。这两个市场的一系列试点实验提出了许多问题，这些问题远远超出了引发实验的原始理论。人们提出了新的实验来回答这些问题。实验的总体重点是更好地理解在具有不确定性和不对称信息的行业中，管理者对竞争对手公司潜在成本结构的信息处理和决策。

Experiments are proposed to study management decision making in industrial markets characterized by uncertainty and asymmetric information: (1) Markets in which incumbent firms may try to limit entry through strategic price manipulations and (2) Markets in which a large chain-store may attempt to limit entry in its markets by establishing a reputation for being a tough competitor. A series of pilot experiments in both markets raise a number of questions that go well beyond the original theory that occasioned the experiments. New experiments are offered to answer these questions. The overall focus of the experiments is to better understand information processing and decision making by managers in industries with uncertainty and asymmetric information regarding rival firms' underlying cost structure.