Learning in Dynamic Games
Learning in Dynamic Games
批准号:
9022642
负责人:
In-Koo Cho
金额:
$5.55万
依托单位:
依托单位国家:
美国
项目类别:
Standard Grant
财政年份:
1991
资助国家:
美国
项目状态:
已结题
起止时间:
1991-03-01 至 1993-08-31
中文摘要
这个项目开发了一个公理直观的学习模型,可以作为从一类动态博弈中选择均衡的替代方法,其中传统的方法如战略稳定性通常是无效的。传统的理性预期均衡往往是无效的,因为它是建立在一个强大的“理性”假设。每个经济主体都必须在没有事先沟通或协调的情况下,完美地预见所有其他人的战略和信念。一种替代传统方法的方法被称为“合理化”。合理化文献开发的解决方案概念直观上比传统方法更合理,但承认太多的结果是一个有效的解决方案概念。另一种选择是开发公理学习模型,对个体经济主体的行为进行非常具体的假设。这个项目的贡献来自于开发公理学习模型,这些模型捕捉了理性的直觉,并对经济问题的结果做出了精确的预测。本项目发展了一个公理化直觉学习理论,并利用它推广了关于持久商品垄断者的科斯定理,这是一个关于垄断行为的重要经济学定理。这一理论也被用来确定学习将导致合作的条件。最后,项目前两部分的结果将应用于交替的报价讨价还价模型,讨价还价的每一方都可以通过接受报价来一劳永逸地停止学习过程。
英文摘要
This project develops an axiomatic intuitive learning model that can be used as an alternative way of selecting an equilibrium from a class of dynamic games, where the conventional approach like strategic stability is often ineffective. The conventional rational expectations equilibrium is often ineffective because it is founded on a strong "rationality" assumption. Each economic agent must perfectly foresee all others' strategies and beliefs without prior communication or coordination. One alternative to the conventional approach is called "rationalizability". The rationalizability literature develops solution concepts that are intuitively more plausible than the conventional approach, but admit too many outcomes to be an effective solution concept. Another alternative is to develop axiomatic learning models with very specific assumptions about the behavior of individual economic agents. The contribution of this project comes from developing axiomatic learning models that capture the intuition of rationalizability and make precise predictions about the outcome of economic problems. The project develops an axiomatic intuitive learning theory and uses it to generalize the Coase theorem for durable good monopolists, an important economic theorem about monopoly behavior. The theory is also used to determine the conditions under which learning will lead to cooperation. Finally, the results obtained in the first two parts of the project will be applied to alternating offer bargaining models, bargaining where each party can stop the learning process once and for all by accepting the offer.
期刊论文(0)
专著(0)
科研奖励(0)
会议论文
Machine Learning in Macroeconomic Modeling
-
批准号:1952882
-
项目类别:Standard Grant
-
资助金额:$25.21万
-
财政年份:2019
-
负责人:In-Koo Cho
-
依托单位:
Learning with Model Uncertainty and Misspecification
-
批准号:1952874
-
项目类别:Standard Grant
-
资助金额:$6.26万
-
财政年份:2019
-
负责人:In-Koo Cho
-
依托单位:
Machine Learning in Macroeconomic Modeling
-
批准号:1824253
-
项目类别:Standard Grant
-
资助金额:$31.1万
-
财政年份:2018
-
负责人:In-Koo Cho
-
依托单位:
Learning with Model Uncertainty and Misspecification
-
批准号:1530589
-
项目类别:Standard Grant
-
资助金额:$33.47万
-
财政年份:2015
-
负责人:In-Koo Cho
-
依托单位:
Social Foundation of Nash Bargaining Solution
-
批准号:1061855
-
项目类别:Standard Grant
-
资助金额:$27.68万
-
财政年份:2011
-
负责人:In-Koo Cho
-
依托单位:
Studies on Dynamic Markets: Small Change and Big Impact
-
批准号:0720592
-
项目类别:Standard Grant
-
资助金额:$14.67万
-
财政年份:2007
-
负责人:In-Koo Cho
-
依托单位:
Learning With Misspecified Models
-
批准号:0004315
-
项目类别:Continuing Grant
-
资助金额:$23.09万
-
财政年份:2001
-
负责人:In-Koo Cho
-
依托单位:
Learning to Cooperate in Repeated Games
-
批准号:9996058
-
项目类别:Continuing Grant
-
资助金额:$4.5万
-
财政年份:1998
-
负责人:In-Koo Cho
-
依托单位:
Learning to Cooperate in Repeated Games
-
批准号:9602082
-
项目类别:Continuing Grant
-
资助金额:$18.2万
-
财政年份:1996
-
负责人:In-Koo Cho
-
依托单位:
Perceptrons Play Repeated Games: New Approach to Bounded Rationality
-
批准号:9596161
-
项目类别:Standard Grant
-
资助金额:$4.28万
-
财政年份:1995
-
负责人:In-Koo Cho
-
依托单位:
Perceptrons Play Repeated Games: New Approach to Bounded Rationality
-
批准号:9223483
-
项目类别:Standard Grant
-
资助金额:$10.15万
-
财政年份:1993
-
负责人:In-Koo Cho
-
依托单位:
Uncertainty and Delay in Bargaining
-
批准号:8618596
-
项目类别:Standard Grant
-
资助金额:$10.78万
-
财政年份:1987
-
负责人:In-Koo Cho
-
依托单位:
国内基金
海外基金
Dynamic Credit Rating with Feedback Effects
-
批准号:--
-
项目类别:外国学者研究基金项目
-
资助金额:--
-
批准年份:2024
-
负责人:Christian Martin Hilpert
-
依托单位: