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Auctions with Entry/Exit Decisions

Auctions with Entry/Exit Decisions
带有进入/退出决定的拍卖
批准号:
9108888
负责人:
James Cox
金额:
$6.62万
依托单位:
依托单位国家:
美国
项目类别:
Standard Grant
财政年份:
1991
资助国家:
美国
项目状态:
已结题
起止时间:
1991-08-15 至 1995-07-31

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中文摘要
翻译
自然发生的拍卖市场具有投标人进入和退出的内生决定的特征。相比之下,以往的理论和实验研究大多假设拍卖中的竞标者数量是外生决定的。提出的研究包括建立具有内生进入和退出决策的拍卖理论并进行实验。第一个应用将是成对的私人价值拍卖,其中拍卖物品的价值可能因不同的竞标者而异,以及公共价值拍卖,其中拍卖物品的价值对所有竞标者都是相同的。这个应用程序的动机是早期的共同价值拍卖实验,在实验中观察到:(1)在3或4人的小组中,受试者的收入仅为预期利润的65%左右;(2)在6到9人的较大群体中,受试者遭受损失,随后破产,导致投标人数量减少。将发展旨在适应投标人内生进入和退出的理论和实验。新的拍卖框架将基于对单个代理人的竞标机会成本的独立抽取。这些将在公共值和私有值环境中使用。将对普通和私人价值拍卖的配对实验进行比较,以测试新模型的含义,包括预测个人退出和进入行为的能力。拍卖市场经济学的内生竞标者延伸将带来各种见解,并提供一个更基本的赢家诅咒概念。
英文摘要
Naturally-occurring auction markets are characterized by endogenous determination of bidder entry and exit. In contrast, most previous theoretical and experimental research has assumed that the number of bidders in an auction is exogenously determined. The proposed research involves developing the theory of and undertaking experiments for auctions with endogenous entry and exit decisions. The first application will be to paired private value auctions, where the value of an auctioned item may differ for different bidders, and to common value auctions, where the value of an auctioned item is the same for all bidders. This application is motivated by earlier experiments with common value auctions in which it was observed that: (1) in small groups of 3 or 4 people, subjects' earning were only about 65% of predicted profits; and (2) in larger groups of 6 to 9 people, subjects incurred losses, followed by bankruptcies, causing attrition in the number of bidders. Theory and experiments that are designed to accommodate endogenous entry and exit of bidders will be developed. The new auction framework will be based on independent draws of individual agents' opportunity costs of bidding. These will be used in both the common value and private value environments. Paired experiments for common and private value auctions that will test the implications of the new models will be compared, including their ability to predict individual exit and entry behavior. The endogenous-bidders extension of the economics of auction markets will lead to various insights, and provide a more fundamental conception of the winner's curse.
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会议论文
Eighth Biennial Conference on Social Dilemmas: Atlanta, GA 2020
Molecular mechanism of NAT1.7-modulated negative regulation of SCN9A expression
  • 批准号:
    MR/R011737/1
  • 项目类别:
    Research Grant
  • 资助金额:
    $83.41万
  • 财政年份:
    2018
  • 负责人:
    James Cox
  • 依托单位:
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  • 批准号:
    G1100340/1
  • 项目类别:
    Fellowship
  • 资助金额:
    $150.81万
  • 财政年份:
    2011
  • 负责人:
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  • 依托单位:
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