Veto Bargaining and Legislative Outcomes

美国国家政府最显著的特征之一是独立的机构，特别是国会和总统，分享制定公共政策的权力。例如，行政部门执行立法部门制定的法律；参议院批准或拒绝总统对最高法院的任命。最令人吃惊的是，总统可以通过行使否决权来阻止国会通过的法案，国会可能会试图推翻他的否决权。虽然权力分立制度是美国公共政策制定的一个关键因素，但政治学家对其中的许多部分知之甚少。例如，以总统否决权为例：一项法案被否决后会发生什么？在什么情况下它会死亡？当国会重新通过一项被否决的法案时，国会是否向总统做出了让步？在什么情况下让步是大的，什么时候是小的？更广泛地说，是什么导致一项法案被否决？虽然否决是罕见的事件，但许多否决都涉及当时重大的立法问题。因此，这些问题的答案将有助于我们理解美国分权制度的一个重要方面。不幸的是，尽管政治学家对否决的频率了解甚多，但他们并不知道上述问题的答案。这有两个原因。首先，这些问题是从一个不同寻常的角度来处理否决权的。他们认为一次否决不是一个孤立的事件，而只是国会和总统之间讨价还价过程中的一个阶段。他们假设对否决权采取循序渐进的讨价还价方式。大多数政治学家倾向于将每次否决视为单独的事件，从而模糊了政府两个部门之间的讨价还价动态。其次，回答这些问题需要个别被否决法案的数据，甚至是所有法案的随机样本，而不仅仅是每个时间段被否决的总数。这些类型的数据从未被收集过，收集它们的过程既繁琐又耗时。这个研究项目针对这两个问题。首先，调查人员从顺序讨价还价的角度审视否决。其次，他们收集个人账单的数据。研究人员将收集大约150个否决“链”法案（否决和重新通过的法案）的数据，随机抽样400个否决法案（约占1946年以来所有否决法案的55%），以及随机抽样大约400个一般法案；总共大约有900张钞票（考虑到样本之间的一些重叠）。通过理论与数据的结合，研究人员将大大提高我们对否决权过程及其在政策制定中的作用的理解。

One of the most distinguishing features of the American national government is the way separated institutions, especially Congress and president, share the power to make public policy. For example, the executive branch implements the laws the legislative branch creates; the Senate approves or rejects the president's appointments to the Supreme Court. Most striking, the president can block a bill passed by Congress by exercising the veto power and Congress may then attempt to override the veto. Although the separated powers system is a critical element of public policy making in the United States, many parts of it are only poorly understood by political scientists. For example, consider the presidential veto: what happens to a bill after it is vetoed? Under what circumstances does it die? When Congress repasses a vetoed bill, does Congress make concessions to the president? Under what circumstances are the concessions large, and when are they small? More broadly, what causes a bill to be vetoed? Although vetoes are rare events, many involve the great legislative issues of the day. So, answers to these questions would help us understand an important aspect of the American system of separated powers. Unfortunately, although political scientists know quite a lot about the frequency of vetoes, they do not know the answers to the above questions. Thre are two reasons for this. First, these questions approach vetoes from an unusual perspective. They assume a single veto is not an isolated event but just one stage in a bargaining process between Congress and president. They assume a sequential bargaining approach to the veto. Most political scientists have tended to approach each veto as a separate event, obscuring the bargaining dynamic between the two branches of government. Second, answering these questions requires data on individual vetoed bills, or even a random sample of all bills, rather than simply the aggregate number of vetoes per time period. These types of data have never been collected, and the process of collecting them is tedious and time consuming. This research project targets both of these problems. First, the investigators examine vetoes from a sequential bargaining perspective. Second, they collect data on individual bills. The researchers will collect data on about one hundred fifty bills in veto "chains" (bills vetoed and repassed), a random sample of four hundred vetoed bills (about fifty five per cent of all vetoes since 1946), and a random sample of about four hundred general bills; a total of about nine hundred bills (allowing for some overlap among the samples). By combining theory and data, the investigators will substantially enhance our understanding of the veto process and the role it plays in policy formulation.