International Environmental Agreements

小行星9309610 这项研究将进一步发展调查员论文“排放控制国际谈判”中提出的问题。“该文件研究了各国加入和留在减少全球污染国际协定中的动机。 它发展了一个关键减排联盟的概念，一个具有所有成员都是成员资格的净收益者的属性。 由于阈值效应的存在，存在一个最小的临界联盟。 早期的文件的结果之一是确定作为非常重要的联盟的稳定性的程度上的交叉影响的净利益之间的国家加入联盟。 这些将被称为“强化机制”。“具体而言，协议的稳定性随着国家i的减排量增加国家j从j的减排量中获得的边际净收益的程度而增加。 然后，本研究将采取两个初步步骤，以实证方式实施关键联盟和强化机制的想法。 其中一项将是初步尝试，以确定避免全球气候变化的替代性最低限度关键联盟。 第二项工作是初步确定强化机制。 ***

9309610 Heal This research will further develop the issue raised in the investigator's paper "International Negotiations on Emission Control." That paper studies the incentives that countries have to join and to remain in international agreements on the abatement of global pollution. It develops the concept of a critical abatement coalition, one with the property that all members are net gainers from membership. There will be a smallest critical coalition because of certain threshold effects. One of the earlier paper's results is to identify as very important in the stability of coalitions the extent of cross effects on net benefits between countries that join a coalition. These will be referred to as "reinforcement mechanisms." In particular, the stability of agreements is increased by the extent to which abatement by country i increases the marginal net benefit of country j from abatement by j. This research will identify and model ways in which the introduction of abatement policies by one country could reduce the abatement costs of another and provide reinforcement mechanisms. The research will then take two initial steps towards empirically implementing the ideas of critical coalitions and reinforcement mechanisms. One will be a preliminary attempt to identify alternative minimum critical coalitions for the avoidance of global climate change. The second will be a preliminary identification of reinforcement mechanisms. ***