Endogenous Rates of Experimentation; Dynamics in Non-Partition Information Models; and Competition in Herd/Cascade Models
Endogenous Rates of Experimentation; Dynamics in Non-Partition Information Models; and Competition in Herd/Cascade Models
批准号:
9409302
负责人:
Eddie Dekel
金额:
$19.1万
依托单位:
依托单位国家:
美国
项目类别:
Continuing Grant
财政年份:
1994
资助国家:
美国
项目状态:
已结题
起止时间:
1994-10-15 至 1998-09-30
中文摘要
小行星9409302 本研究主要围绕三个方面展开:(1)实验和/或突变是近年来经济学学习和进化研究中所使用的模型的重要组成部分。 该提案开发了一些模型,在这些模型中,实验的速率是自己学习或模仿的,然后探索环境的不同方面如何影响长期出现的实验速率。 (2)模型中的可能的信息接收到的个人不分区的一组状态的世界已被用来介绍各种元素的有限理性决策和博弈论。 然而,这些模型隐含地假设参与者不知道他们的信息集,而在游戏中的应用程序往往隐含地假设信息结构是共同的知识。 该研究通过明确开发一个动态过程来探索这种明显的冲突,即玩家如何使用他们的信息。 一个相关的目标是开发一个明确的遗忘模型,看看它如何对应于没有分区的一般模型。 (3)羊群模型或信息级联模型,即买家模仿之前的买家,而不是使用自己的私人信息,忽略了这样一个事实,即卖家有强烈的动机来吸引买家为自己的产品创造一个羊群/级联。 该研究将探讨这种情况可能发生的程度,什么类型的卖家将投资于错误地创建牛群/级联,以及当卖家试图创建牛群/级联时,是否使用了更多或更少的信息。
英文摘要
9409302 Dekel This project focuses on three research topics: (1) Experiments and or mutations are an important ingredient in the models used in the recent research on learning and evolution in economics. The proposal develops models where rates of experimentation are themselves learned or mimicked and then explores how different aspects of the environment influence the rate of experimentation that arises in the long run. (2) Models where the possible information received by an individual does not partition the set of states of the world have been used to introduce various elements of bounded rationality into decision making and game theory. However, these models implicitly assume that players are unaware of their information sets, while the applications in games often implicitly assume that the information structure is common knowledge. The research explores this apparent conflict by explicitly developing a dynamic process of how players use their information. A related objective is to develop an explicit model of forgetfulness to see how it corresponds to the general models without partitions. (3) Models of herds, or informational cascades, where buyers mimic preceding buyers rather than using their own private information ignore the fact that sellers have strong incentives to entice buyers to create a herd/cascade for their own product. The research will explore the extent to which this can happen, what types of sellers will invest in falsely creating herds/cascades, and whether more or less information is used when sellers are activity trying to create herds/cascades.
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会议论文
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依托单位:
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