The Political Economy of International Trade Relations (Accomplishment-Based Renewal)

[9514974]格罗斯曼这项基于成就的美国国家科学基金资助“国际贸易关系的政治经济学”的续期继续研究影响国际贸易的政策形成。分析方法涉及对具有政治动机的当选代表所面临的激励以及特殊利益集团为追求特殊利益所采取的行动进行正式建模。正在进行的研究集中在三个主要领域。首先，它考察了贸易政策的动态，以应对贸易条件的一次性变化和比较优势的反复变化。这种分析纳入了目光短浅、无法承诺未来贸易政策走向的政客。其次，它研究能够促进更有效的贸易政策结果的国内和国际政治规则和制度的设计。最后，它以涵盖一系列主题和方法的综合专著的形式整合了这项工作和有关贸易政策政治经济学的相关研究。最近关于贸易政策的公开辩论使环保主义者反对自由贸易利益。调查人员先前的工作表明，没有假设贸易自由化将对环境有害。在这个项目中，调查人员研究了不同政策问题之间相互作用的政治经济学。假设环保主义者期望，如果贸易更加自由，那么国内的环境标准就会比贸易壁垒保护进口竞争行业的特殊利益更宽松。然后，环保主义者可能会支持保护，以确保更严格的标准，防止“向下协调”，即使贸易保护并不直接符合他们自己的利益。

9514974 Grossman This Accomplishment-Based Renewal of the NSF grant entitled "the Political Economy of International Trade Relations" continues the study of the formation of policies that affect international trade. The analytic approach involves formal modeling of the incentives facing politically motivated elected representatives, and the actions taken by special interest groups in pursuit of particularlistic benefits. The ongoing research concentrates in three main areas. First, it examines the dynamics of trade policy in response to a one-shot change in the terms of trade and to recurring shifts in comparative advantage. The analysis incorporates politicians who have short-time horizons and who cannot commit the future course of trade policy. Second, it studies the design of political rules and institutions, both domestic and international, that can promote more efficient trade policy outcomes. Finally, it integrates this work and related research on the political economy of trade policy, in the form of an integrative monograph covering a range of topics and approaches. Recent public debate over trade policy has pitted environmentalists against free trade interests. The previous work by the investigators demonstrated that there is no presumption that trade liberalization will be harmful to the environment. In this project the investigators examine the political economy of the interaction between different policy issues. Suppose that environmentalists expect that environmental standards at home will be looser if trade is freer than if trade barriers protect special interests in the import-competing industries. Then the environmentalists might support protection in order to secure stricter standards and prevent "downward harmonization," even if trade protection is not directly in their own interest.