The Political Economy of International Trade Relations

本项目研究影响政策的形成 国际贸易和全球环境。 而贸易 文献已经投入了大量的注意力来确定政策， 最大化总福利，相对而言， 去理解现实政治中会出现什么样的政策 在这一过程中，决策者必须对双方的要求作出反应。 特殊利益集团和全体选民。 政治经济学 一个模型已经开发出来，其中当选官员回应， 政治激励。 该模型将被推广应用于 考虑保护的均衡结构等问题， 政府贸易政策工具的选择，互动 贸易与环境政策之间（以及利益之间） 支持这两种干预措施的团体）， 两国政府之间的互动 合作和非合作的设置。 本研究的最终目的是评价 世界贸易体系的"游戏规则"。 它 希望能够确定一些规则， 自由贸易体制，从贸易中获得最大的互利， 在国际环境问题上进行有效合作。 为了做到这一点，理论框架必须首先 制定和完善，以便新出现的政策成果能够 在不同的可能的制度约束下预测。

This project studies the formation of policies that affect international trade and the global environment. While the trade literature has devoted much attention to identifying policies that maximize aggregate welfare, relatively little effort has been made to understand what policies will emerge from a realistic political process in which policy makers must respond to the demands of both special interests and the general electorate. A political economy model has been developed in which elected officials respond to political incentives. This model will be extended and applied to consider such problems as the equilibrium structure of protection, the government's choice of trade policy instrument, the interaction between trade and environmental policies (and between the interest groups that support these two types of interventions), and the interaction between governments of different countries in both cooperative and noncooperative settings. The ultimate aim of the research is to evaluate alternative institutional "rules of the game" for the world trading system. It is hoped that rules will be identified that will facilitate a liberal trading regime with greatest mutual benefits from trade and with efficient cooperation on international environmental matters. In order to accomplish this, the theoretical framework must first be developed and refined so that emerging policy outcomes can be predicted under different possible institutional constraints.