Investigations of Behavior in Strategic Environments with Unique Mixed Strategy Solutions

在实验和社会规范的发展中，动力学的进化模型一直是对个体行为的有力解释的来源。本项目综合了这两种应用，并对在特殊赌博和集体赌博之间进行选择的个人群体进行了实验。这项研究是基于Arthur Robson的工作，该工作表明，在进化动力学中，对特殊赌博的选择存在系统偏差。如果这些模型在经验上被证明是稳健的，那么我们就可以自信地将这些进化模型应用于理解风险资产市场是如何发展的等主题。

Evolutionary models of dynamics have been a source of robust explanations of individual behavior in experiments and in the development of social norms. This project synthesizes these two applications as experiments are conducted on populations of individuals who choose between idiosyncratic and aggregate gambles. This research is based upon the work of Arthur Robson which shows that there are systematic biases in the evolutionary dynamics toward the selection of idiosyncratic gambles. If these models prove to be empirically robust, then we can confidently apply these evolutionary models to topics such as understanding how markets for risky assets have developed.