Adverse Selection in Durable Goods Markets

逆向选择是造成市场效率低下的一个重要原因，耐用品市场尤其可能受到逆向选择的影响。 二手车市场 这是一个典型的市场逆向选择的例子。 在任何这些市场中，逆向选择都是一个潜在的问题，因为所有者首先了解货物的质量，然后决定是否在二手市场进行交易。 这项研究将分析一个市场，在这个市场中，每一个时期都有新的单位的产量到达，消费者自我选择购买新车或二手汽车。 因此，与以前的文献相反，逆向选择，汽车的所有权是内生的。 初步结果表明，在分析中纳入新产品的市场有重要的影响。 首先，二手市场的交易量总是低于100%，但二手市场永远不会关闭。 这是一个事实的结果，与以前的文献相比，在这个模型中，一辆二手车的卖家可以买一辆新车，而不是一无所有。 第二，这项研究表明，在社会福利的分析中有新的方面，对关于逆向选择的一些“共同智慧”提出了质疑。 特别是，一个例子表明，福利可以更高的逆向选择比当所有消费者都被要求进行交易，或者，当没有质量的不确定性。 第三，这一框架允许考虑逆选择对新耐用品市场的影响，因此，对制造商的激励措施，以影响消费者的行为，在逆选择的存在。 逆向选择的恶化可能会使垄断者受益，而垄断者可能会生产出不可靠的汽车。 本研究将分析合同安排，制造商可以采用影响消费者的行为：业主之间的保修范围，制造商翻新和认证的使用，租赁合同的结构的可转让性。

Adverse selection is an important source of market inefficiency and markets for durable goods are particularly likely to suffer from adverse selection. Indeed the used car market is the prototypical example of a market subject to adverse selection. In any of these markets adverse selection is a potential problem because first owners learn the quality of the good and then decide whether to trade them in the used market. This research will analyze a market where a flow of output of new units arrives every period, consumers self-select into buying new or used cars. Thus, in contrast to the previous literature on adverse selection, the ownership of cars is endogenous. Preliminary results indicate that incorporating in the analysis the market for new goods has important consequences. First, the volume of trade in the used market is always less than 100%, but the used market never closes. This is a consequence of the fact that, in contrast with the previous literature, in this model a seller of a used car gets to buy a new car instead of being left with nothing. Second, this research suggests that there are new dimensions in the analysis of social welfare that put in question some `common wisdom` concerning adverse selection. In particular, an example shows that welfare can be higher under adverse selection than when all consumers are required to trade or, alternatively, when there is no quality uncertainty. Third, this framework allows consideration of the effects of adverse selection on the market for new durable goods and, therefore, on manufacturer incentives to influence the behavior of consumers in the presence of adverse selection. It is possible that a worsening of adverse selection may benefit a monopolist, who may then produce unreliable cars. This research will then analyze contractual arrangements that the manufacturers can employ to affect the behavior of consumers: the transferability of warranty coverage between owners, manufacturers refurbishment and certification of the used, and the structure of leasing contracts.