Corporate and Managerial Liability: Empirical and Experimental Analysis

这个项目涉及两个独立的实证分析公司和管理责任。第一部分分析了根据新的联邦组织量刑指南对公司的刑事量刑。该研究将新准则与现有实践和最优公司责任进行了比较。该项目还分析了企业缓刑（非货币制裁）的使用，以及对企业不法行为负责的个人的命运。第二个项目关注的是管理者对股东的不当行为。该研究考察了强加给管理者的信义义务的性质，以诱导他们勤勉地完成工作（“应有的注意”），并且不为自己的目的挪用公司的资产（“忠诚义务”）。经济理论认为，这些义务是相同的，但法律对待它们的方式不同。第二个子项目将使用实验方法测试法律区别。实验对象作为委托人或代理人，随机决定，进行两阶段博弈。在第一个过程中，两对参与者决定是否将他们的资产合并到一个联合项目中。在第二种情况下，代理人有机会挪用资产。中心命题将通过评估受试者在扣留自己的资产时与挪用他人的资产时是否建立不同的惩罚来检验（关心与忠诚）。第一个子项目将使用《准则》颁布之前的公司量刑数据库，并创建一个此后的类似量刑数据集。本研究的结果将推进联邦法院有关公司刑事判决的社会法律理论，并推进人们的行为如何符合或不符合管理责任的法律概念的知识。这个项目涉及对公司和管理层责任的两个独立的实证分析。第一部分分析了根据新的联邦组织量刑指南对公司的刑事量刑。该研究将新准则与现有实践和最优公司责任进行了比较。该项目还分析了企业缓刑（非货币制裁）的使用，以及对企业不法行为负责的个人的命运。第二个项目关注的是管理者对股东的不当行为。该研究考察了强加给管理者的信义义务的性质，以诱导他们勤勉地完成工作（“应有的注意”），并且不为自己的目的挪用公司的资产（“忠诚义务”）。经济理论认为，这些义务是相同的，但法律对待它们的方式不同。第二个子项目将使用实验方法测试法律区别。实验对象作为委托人或代理人，随机决定，进行两阶段博弈。在第一个过程中，两对参与者决定是否将他们的资产合并到一个联合项目中。在第二种情况下，代理人有机会挪用资产。中心命题将通过评估受试者在扣留自己的资产时与挪用他人的资产时是否建立不同的惩罚来检验（关心与忠诚）。第一个子项目将使用《准则》颁布之前的公司量刑数据库，并创建一个此后的类似量刑数据集。本研究的结果将推进联邦法院有关公司刑事判决的社会法律理论，并推进人们的行为如何符合或不符合管理责任的法律概念的知识。

This project involves two separate empirical analyses of corporate and managerial liability. The first analyzes criminal sentencing of corporations under the new federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations. The research compares the new Guidelines to existing practice and to optimal corporate liability. The project also analyses the use of corporate probation (nonmonetary sanctions) as well as the fate of the individuals responsible for corporate wrongdoing. The second project focuses on wrongdoing by managers against shareholders. The research examines the nature of fiduciary duties imposed on managers to induce them to perform their jobs diligently (take `due care`) and not misappropriate the firm's assets for their own purposes (`duty of loyalty`). Economic theory suggests that these duties are the same, yet the law treats them differently. This second subproject will test the legal distinction using experimental methods. Experimental subjects serve as principals or agents, randomly determined, and play a two-stage game. In the first, the pairs of participants decide if they will combine their assets in a joint project. In the second, the agent has an opportunity to misappropriate assets. The central proposition will be tested by evaluating whether subjects establish different penalties when withholding their own assets than when misappropriating the assets of the other (care vs. Loyalty). The first subproject will use a database on corporate sentencing prior to the enactment of the Guidelines and create an analogous dataset on sentencing since. The results of this research will advance sociolegal theory about corporate criminal sentencing in federal courts and advance or knowledge of how people's behavior does or does not conform to legal notions of managerial duty. %%% This project involves two separate empirical analyses of corporate and managerial liability. The first analyzes criminal sentencing of corporations under the new federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations. The research compares the new Guidelines to existing practice and to optimal corporate liability. The project also analyses the use of corporate probation (nonmonetary sanctions) as well as the fate of the individuals responsible for corporate wrongdoing. The second project focuses on wrongdoing by managers against shareholders. The research examines the nature of fiduciary duties imposed on managers to induce them to perform their jobs diligently (take `due care`) and not misappropriate the firm's assets for their own purposes (`duty of loyalty`). Economic theory suggests that these duties are the same, yet the law treats them differently. This second subproject will test the legal distinction using experimental methods. Experimental subjects serve as principals or agents, randomly determined, and play a two-stage game. In the first, the pairs of participants decide if they will combine their assets in a joint project. In the second, the agent has an opportunity to misappropriate assets. The central proposition will be tested by evaluating whether subjects establish different penalties when withholding their own assets than when misappropriating the assets of the other (care vs. Loyalty). The first subproject will use a database on corporate sentencing prior to the enactment of the Guidelines and create an analogous dataset on sentencing since. The results of this research will advance sociolegal theory about corporate criminal sentencing in federal courts and advance or knowledge of how people's behavior does or does not conform to legal notions of managerial duty.