Dissertation Research: Public Law and Private Power: The Comparative Political Economy of Corporate Governance in the U.S. and Germany

本项目考察了美国和德国的政治和法律的制度如何通过公司内部经济权力和法律的权威的分配来塑造公司治理。该研究开发了一个公司治理的政治经济模型，作为一个由公司法，金融市场监管和劳动法组成的三方结构，并比较了美国和德国公司治理制度的变化和稳定的政治，监管和经济动态。重点是这些经济体的政治和法律的结构如何应对国际金融市场的巨大变化，同时在其治理机构中容纳不同的社会价值观。该项目侧重于治理的三个核心方面：（1）比较监管政治;（2）劳工和雇员利益;（3）机构投资者的角色和利益。 详细的定性研究将涉及美国和德国公司治理的一系列案例研究。这种对“行动中的法律”的描述和分析将填补公司治理文献中的一个重大空白，因为这些文献往往强调正式的经济和法律的模式。 通过关注公司行为者如何塑造和应对法律的和经济影响，研究将治理改革的政策问题置于必须加以解决的政治和体制背景中。

This project examines how political and legal institutions shape corporate governance in the United States and Germany through the allocation of economic power and legal authority within the corporation. The research develops a political economic model of corporate governance as a tripartite structure comprised of company law, financial market regulation, and labor law, and compares the political, regulatory, and economic dynamics of change and stability in the American and German corporate governance regimes. The focus is on how the political and legal structures of these economies have responded to enormous changes in international financial markets, while accommodating different social values in their governance institutions. The project focuses on three central aspects of governance: (1) comparative regulatory politics; (2) labor and employee interests; and (3) the roles and interests of institutional investors. Detailed qualitative research will involve a set of case studies of governance in American and German corporations. This description and analysis of the "law in action" will fill a significant gap in the corporate governance literature, which has tended to emphasize formal economic and legal models. By focusing on how corporate actors shape and respond to legal and economic influences, the research places policy issues of governance reform in the political and institutional context in which they must be addressed.