Collaborative Research: Strategic Defiance of the U.S. Supreme Court

这项研究考察了联邦系统中上诉法院对凝视先例原则的背离。偏差可以采取微妙的形式，包括区分、限制或避免先例。这项研究的目标是确定为什么下级法院违抗(或遵守)上级法院。研究计划是：(1)生成美国最高法院裁决的随机样本；(2)跟踪下级法院对这些裁决的反应(所有假设的因变量)；(3)收集必要的数据，以激活自变量；以及(4)实施统计模型，测试理论上关键变量的影响。数据来源多种多样，包括传记材料、国家科学基金会支持的数据库、司法判决和定期指南--最后的数据库保存在国际和平研究所的网站上，也保存在国际和平与安全委员会的档案中。这里产生的经验结论将展示联邦司法机构设计的具体特征如何推进或延缓垂直凝视先例，至少部分揭示美国法院法治的制度基础，并展示组织设计和运作创造的各种结构性激励的效果。

This research examines deviation from the principle of stare decisis, or following precedent, by appellate courts in the federal system. Deviation can take subtle forms, including distinguishing, limiting, or avoiding precedents. The goal of the research is to determine why lower courts defy (or comply with) higher courts. The research plan is to: (1) generate a random sample of U.S. Supreme Court decisions; (2) track the responses of lower courts to these decisions (the dependent variable for all the hypotheses); (3) collect data necessary to animate the independent variables; and (4) implement statistical models, testing for the influence of theoretically-critical variables. Data come from a variety of sources, including biographical materials, NSF-supported databases, judicial decisions, and periodical guides-with the final data base archived on the PI web site and with the ICPSR. The empirical findings generated here will show how specific features of the design of the federal judiciary advance or retard vertical stare decisis, revealing, at least partially, the institutional foundations of the rule of law in American courts and showing the effect of various structural incentives created by the design and operation of organizations.