ITR: Secure Automated Negotiation under Limited Computation: Deliberation in Equilibrium

多方越来越多地使用分布式信息系统，特别是互联网，进行自动谈判。博弈论为在这些系统的相互作用机制中引入激励机制提供了基础，从而产生理想的社会结果——即使各方的行为都是基于自身利益。然而，当涉及到激励和计算时，博弈论中存在一个危险的空白，使这样的系统容易被操纵。博弈论的扩展认为，地址计算需要在参与者是自利的情况下进行，并且存在一个潜在的棘手问题，限制了代理的合理性。在这个项目中，正在开发一种交互理论，其中计算行为被视为每个代理策略的一部分。这项工作涉及模型开发、博弈论分析、机制和算法设计以及计算实验。这项研究为构建安全系统铺平了道路，这些系统既能抵御操纵，又能在计算上可行。正在发展的理论允许在计算是一个问题的情况下构建最优谈判代理。这使得在这些软件代理的协助下，新手与专业市场参与者处于平等的竞争环境，从而能够更广泛、更公平地进入互联网商务。正在开发的方法还能够设计经济上和计算上更有效的相互作用机制。

Multiple parties are increasingly using distributed information systems, especially the Internet, for automated negotiations. Game theory provides a basis for engineering incentives into the interaction mechanisms of these systems so that desirable social outcomes follow -- even though every party acts based on self-interest. However, there is a hazardous gap in game theory when it comes to incentives and computation, leaving such systems open to manipulation. Extensions to game theory that address computation are required for settings where the participants are self-interested, and there is an underlying intractable problem that limits the agents' rationality. In this project, a theory of interaction is being developed where computational actions are treated as part of each agent's strategy. The work involves model development, game-theoretic analysis, mechanism and algorithm design, and computational experiments. This research paves the way to building secure systems that are robust against manipulation, yet computationally feasible. The theories being developed allow the construction of optimal negotiating agents in settings where computation is an issue. This enables wider and fairer access to Internet commerce by putting novices, assisted by these software agents, on an equal playing field with expert market participants. The methodology being developed also enables the design of economically and computationally more efficient interaction mechanisms.