Labor Market Compensation and Economic Behavior: An Experimental Examination of Team Production and Tournaments

在劳动力市场的标准经济理论中，员工的薪酬是基于他们个人对产出的贡献的价值：同事的相对表现不影响薪酬。但越来越多的公司正在制定薪酬安排，不按照劳动力市场的标准理论来奖励员工。在一种通常被称为锦标赛的安排中，奖励是基于参与者的相对表现，而不是他们的绝对表现。在另一种通常被称为团队生产的安排中，团队而不是个人负责一系列任务。如果公司只能衡量团队产出，公司就不能根据团队成员的个人贡献来补偿他们。尽管锦标赛和团队生产在劳动力市场上普遍存在，但经济文献中关于锦标赛和团队生产下的行为的内容相对较少。这些实验评估在锦标赛和团队生产下的行为、表现和冒险行为。这样的实验可以更好地理解不同补偿方案下的行为，也为合同的设计提供了基础。本提案中的研究提供了三个独立的研究。第一项研究考虑了锦标赛参与者是否对锦标赛的成功过于乐观(即高估了他们的相对表现)，以及这是否导致太多个人进入锦标赛市场。如果有太多人进入，我们可能会实施公共政策，以减少与过度拥挤相关的低效率。第二个研究考虑了团队生产下的绩效是否根据以下因素而变化：i)团队成员的数量；ii)团队成员是否知道其他团队成员的绩效信息；iii)公司是否设定了生产目标并在超过目标时奖励团队。更好地理解团队生产有助于设计有关公司内部和公司之间合同关系的公共政策。最后一项研究考虑了避免损失的非理性欲望，即所谓的损失厌恶，是否是锦标赛表现的重要决定因素，以及这种影响是否会随着时间的推移而减弱。这些信息在劳动合同的设计中很重要。为了评估在锦标赛和团队合作下的表现和冒险行为，我们以宾夕法尼亚州立大学的学生为受试者进行了对照实验。受试者完成一项基于计算机的数值预报任务，以衡量表现。为了模拟劳动力市场决策，受试者在每次实验结束时根据他们预测的准确性支付工资。

In the standard economic theory of labor markets, employees are compensated based on the value of their individual contributions to output: the relative performance of co-workers does not affect compensation. But corporations are increasingly instituting compensation arrangements that do not reward employees in accordance with the standard theory of labor markets. In one arrangement, often referred to as a tournament, rewards are based upon the relative performance of the participants rather than their absolute performance. In another arrangement, often referred to as team production, teams rather than individuals are responsible for a set of tasks. If firms are able to measure only team output, firms cannot compensate team members in accordance with their individual contributions. Despite widespread incidence of tournaments and team production in labor markets, the economic literature contains relatively little on behavior in tournaments and under team production. These experiments assess behavior, performance, and risk taking under tournaments and team production. Such experiments provide a better understanding of behavior under various compensation schemes as well as a basis for the design of contracts. The research in this proposal provides three separate studies. The first study considers whether tournament participants are overly optimistic regarding success in tournaments (i.e. overestimate their relative performance) and whether this causes too many individuals to enter tournament markets. If too many individuals enter, we may implement public policies to reduce the inefficiencies related to overcrowding. The second study considers whether performance under team production varies based on: i) the number of team members; ii) whether team members have information about the performance of other team members; and iii) whether the firm sets production targets and rewards the team when they exceed the target. A better understanding of team production helps in the design of public policies concerning contractual relations within and between firms. The final study considers whether an irrational desire to avoid losses, referred to as loss aversion, is an important determinant of performance in tournaments and whether this effect diminishes over time. Such information is important in the design of labor contracts. To assess performance and risk taking in tournaments and under team production, we conduct controlled experiments using students at The Pennsylvania State University as subjects. Subjects complete a computer-based numerical forecasting task to measure performance. To simulate labor market decisions, subjects are paid based on the accuracy of their forecasts at the end of each experimental session.