Policy Networks and Federal Enforcement: Do Local Networks Enhance NPDES Permit Enforcement?

这项研究调查了涉及相同政策领域的联邦机构和地方政策网络之间鲜有研究的互动。该项目对Ostrom(1990)的框架进行了扩展，以开发这样一种假设：参与“管理公地”的密集、重叠、面向本地的股东网络将加强执行和遵守联邦法规。虽然奥斯特罗姆的分析澄清了中央监管政策对“管理公地”的地方机构的潜在不利影响，但该项目调查了在美国更复杂的联邦系统中，地方网络可能对联邦政策产生的潜在有利影响。水资源管理为观察两种管理用水的制度方法之间的相互作用提供了关键的研究场所；环境保护局根据1972年的《清洁水法》创建的“第一代”联邦许可制度，以及在过去十年中为解决联邦许可制度没有解决的污染和用水问题而发展起来的地方流域管理网络和机构(Kraft和Vig 2000)。在美国联邦制的复杂制度环境中，水政策网络可能涉及排污者、受污染影响的利益相关者，特别是来自联邦、州和地方机构的民选和行政官员，这些机构对水管理问题拥有地方管辖权。有效的网络可以为其成员提供可与Ostrom(1990)研究的自组织机构相媲美的合作优势。我们探讨了这一视角对地方网络和联邦执法之间的相互作用的三个含义：*地方制裁假说：有效的网络提高遵从性。*放大假说：有效的网络增加执法行动对遵从性的威慑影响。*集中度假说：有效的网络增加了检查活动。为了检验这些假设，该项目整合了两个独立的传统，它们研究执法系统的相反部分：分析监管执法行动的政治影响的官僚机构民主控制文献，以及分析执法行动对合规的威慑效果的威慑文献。第一阶段的研究采用回归分析的方法，根据所有许可证持有人的现有档案记录来测试假设，而第二阶段则为抽样的许可证持有人发展本地网络的直接量度，以提供更深入的分析：第一阶段分析环境保护局的许可证遵行系统(PCS)自1994年至今整段期间的季度执法和遵从性数据。关于许可证持有者和地方政策网络的必要补充数据将从人口普查和政府数据库中补充。我们应用范斯坦的检测控制估计程序(范斯坦1989,1990)来同时估计在此期间活跃的所有主要许可证持有者的执法行动和合规反应。然后使用第一阶段分析的经验结果来开发第二阶段样品。第二阶段：第二阶段有五个具体目标：i)为许可证持有者样本开发与许可证执行和合规制度相关的本地政策网络的调查数据；2)计算基于调查的网络能力衡量标准，并分析这些衡量标准与先前分析得出的县级因素之间的联系；3)用改进后的措施重复第一阶段测试；4)扩展第一阶段测试以包括对与合规有关的信念和态度的分析；以及5)在选定的四个社区开展验证性案例研究。该项目将在机构政治经济学、官僚控制、执法和威慑理论等领域发表期刊文章。执行的详细效率分析将与环境保护局的执行政策直接相关。最后，一本书将把项目结果与治理机构设计的更广泛的研究背景相结合，重点放在联邦和地方方法之间的优势、局限性和相互作用上。

This research investigates the little-studied interaction between federal agencies and local policy networks concerned with the same policy arenas. The project extends Ostrom's (1990) framework to develop the hypothesis that dense, overlapping, locally-oriented networks of shareholders involved in "governing the commons" will increase both enforcement and compliance with' federal regulations. While Ostrom's analysis clarifies the potentially adverse impact of central regulatory policies on local institutions that "govern the commons", this project investigates the potentially beneficial impact that local networks may have on federal policies in the more complex federal system in America. Water resource management provides the critical research site for observing the interaction between two institutional approaches to the governance of water usage; the EPA's "first generation" federal permit system created by the Clean Water Act of 1972, and the local watershed management networks and institutions that have evolved during the last decade to resolve pollution and water usage issues not addressed by the federal permit system (Kraft and Vig 2000). In the complex institutional environment of the U.S. Federalist system, water policy networks may involve pollution dischargers, stakeholders affected by pollution, and in particular the elected and administrative officials from federal, state, and local institutions that have local jurisdiction over water management issues. Effective networks can provide cooperative advantages to its members comparable to those of the self-organized institutions studied by Ostrom (1990). We explore three implications of this perspective for the interaction between local networks and federal enforcement: *Local Sanction Hypothesis: Effective networks increase compliance.*Magnification Hypothesis: Effective networks increase the deterrence impact of enforcement actions on compliance. * Concentration Hypothesis: Effective networks increase inspection activities. To test these hypotheses, the project integrates two independent traditions that study opposite halves of the enforcement system: the democratic control of bureaucracy literature that analyzes political influence on regulatory enforcement actions, and the deterrence literature that analyzes the deterrence effects of enforcement actions on compliance. The first phase of research uses regression analysis based on available archival records of all permit holders to test the hypotheses, while the second phase develops direct measures of local networks for a sample of permit holders to provide a more intensive analysis: Phase One: The first phase analyzes quarterly enforcement and compliance data from the EP A's Permit Compliance System (PCS) for the full period for which data are available, from 1994 to present. The required supplementary data on permit holders and local policy networks will be appended from census and governmental databases. We apply Feinstein's detection-controlled estimation procedure (Feinstein 1989, 1990) to simultaneously estimate enforcement actions and compliance responses for all major permit holders active throughout this period. Empirical results from phase-one analysis are then used for developing the phase-two sample. Phase Two: The second phase has five specific goals: I) develop survey-based data on the local policy networks relevant to the permit enforcement and compliance system for a sample of permit holders, 2) calculate survey-based measures of network capabilities and analyze the link between these measures and the county-level factors from the previous analysis, 3) repeat phase one tests with the improved measures, 4) extend phase one tests to include the analysis of beliefs and attitudes related to compliance, and 5) develop confirmatory case studies in four selected communities. The project will produce journal articles in the fields of the political economy of institutions, bureaucratic controls, and enforcement and deterrence theory. Detailed efficiency analysis of enforcement will be directly relevant to EPA enforcement policies. Finally a book will integrate project findings with the broader research context of the design of governance institutions, with a focus on the advantages, limitations, and interactions between federal and local approaches to "governing the commons."