Democratic Controls over Tax Enforcement

上个世纪最引人注目的政治发展之一是政府管制的扩大以及随之而来的“民事”执法机构侵入社会和经济生活的大多数领域。特别是在过去三十年中，政府机构的权力范围和规模急剧增长，这些机构将强制执法活动的重点放在普通公民身上，而不是罪犯和犯罪活动上。虽然对监管执法和行政司法的研究也迅速扩大，但我们对民事执法和非警务执法机构行为的认识存在相当大的差距。特别是，本项目处理的关键问题是，执法机构扩大的强制性活动在多大程度上受到民主政治体制和原则的控制。本项目分析联邦机构的强制执行权在多大程度上受到民选官员和民主原则的控制。该项目扩大了概念框架，包括效率和平等的民主原则，这些原则甚至可能限制民选官员对针对公民的执法行动施加的控制。研究小组分析了美国国税局（IRS）执法活动对民主控制的反应。这将通过与美国国税局的财务和检查官员以及华盛顿、纽约和加利福尼亚的政治领导人和知识渊博的观察家的访谈来完成。研究人员将开发三个国家级数据库，包括：1960-1980年按审计类别划分的国税局审计活动；1960-1990年个人和公司审计活动总数；1975-1990年美国国税局工作人员。他们将使用多种指标来调查总统、国会、州长和州立法官员对国税局审计和人员的影响。他们将澄清概念，制定措施，并探讨效率和平等的民主原则对国税局审计和人员的影响。最后，他们将比较不同时间、州和审计类别的审计在改善税收合规方面的执法生产功能的有效性。本研究将对美国国税局的执法进行广泛的分析，重点关注政治控制、民主原则、组织约束和执法效率的影响，以解释过去三十年来各州和纳税人类别的执法差异。

One of the most striking political developments of the past century has been the expansion of government regulation and the consequent intrusion of "civil" enforcement agencies into most areas of social and economic life. The past three decades in particular has witnessed a dramatic growth in the scope of authority and size of government agencies that focus coercive enforcement activities on normal citizens, rather than on criminals and criminal activities. While studies of regulatory enforcement and administrative justice have also expanded rapidly, there is a considerable gap in our knowledge of civil enforcement and the behavior of non-policement enforcement agencies. In particular, the critical question addressed in this project is the extent to which the expanded coercive activities of enforcement agencies are controlled by democratic political institutions and principles. This project analyzes the extent to which the coercive enforcement powers of federal agencies are controlled by elected officials and democratic principles. The project expands the conceptual framework to include the democratic principles of efficiency and equality, which may constrain even controls exerted by elected officials over enforcement actions against citizens. The research team analyzes the responsiveness of Internal Revenue Service (IRS) enforcement activities to democratic controls. This will be accomplished through interviews with Financial and Examination officials in the IRS and political leaders and knowledgeable observers in Washington, New York and California. The researchers will develop three state-level data bases consisting of: IRS audit activities by audit class for 1960-1980; total individual and corporate audit activities for 1960-1990; and, IRS personnel for 1975-1990. They will use multiple indicators to probe the impact of presidential, congressional, gubernatorial, and state legislative officials on IRS audits and personnel. They will clarify the concepts, develop measures, and probe the impact of the democratic principles of efficiency and equality on IRS audits and personnel. Finally, they will compare enforcement production functions for effectiveness of audits in improving tax compliance over time, states, and audit classes. This research will provide an extensive analysis of IRS enforcement, focusing on the impact of political controls, democratic principles, organizationl constraints, and enforcement effectiveness in explaining the variance of enforcement across tates and taxpayer categories for the last three decades.