Collaborative Research on the Political Control of Trial Court Judges

本提案对美国各州初审法院法官的选择、保留和直接控制的不同方法的起源和影响进行研究。该研究项目解决了两个相互关联的问题：(1)初审法官在职时的决定如何受到a)选择他们的方法和b)对其自由裁量权的正式限制的影响？(2)如何解释美国各州对初审法官自由裁量权的正式限制的差异？初审法官是美国政治体系中有影响力的角色，自美国建国以来，对他们的选择和限制方法一直存在争议。然而，对司法权的关注并没有产生相应的比较实证研究，以研究不同的选拔制度或对司法自由裁量权的事前限制对初审法官行为的影响。此外，政治学家还没有进行太多的比较工作来解释对审判法官自由裁量权采取限制的差异。我们试图通过构建和测试审判法官的选择、保留和直接控制的代理理论模型来弥补这一弱点。这项研究将有助于为正在进行的关于选择和保留初审法院法官的不同规则的后果的公共政策辩论提供经验证据，并将作出贡献。与现有的关注选民行为、选举结果或法官描述性特征的选拔制度研究不同，研究人员对初审法官的行为进行了直接的比较研究。此外，他们试图了解量刑指南和强制性判决等自由裁量权的事前约束如何与选择系统相互作用，从而影响审判法官的行为。虽然政治学家已经研究了上诉法院法官在不同选举制度下的行为，但这些发现可能不适用于数量更多、不太公开的初审法官的行为，他们的行为在很大程度上决定着国家强制权力的逐案应用。研究人员将继续目前正在进行的研究，以编制三个数据集进行定量分析，并对各种制度背景下的在职审判法官进行非结构化定性访谈。该项目提供了两个重要的下游效益。首先，研究者构建并记录了三个数据集，这些数据集详细描述了司法量刑行为、审判法官的遴选经历和履历特征，以及对司法自由裁量权的直接约束性质。这些数据集和随附的文档将放在公共领域。这些数据集将补充对州上诉法院的研究，并允许其他研究人员对司法选择、初审法官行为和州刑事司法政策制定进行比较研究。其次，进行这项研究将提供机会，通过让研究生参与本项目中使用的数据集的构建、记录和分析，来加强对他们的培训。

This proposal undertakes research on the origins and implications of different methods for the selection, retention, and direct control of trial court judges in the American states. The research project addresses two interrelated questions: (1) How are trial judges' decisions in office influenced by a) the method of choosing them and b) formal constraints on their discretion? (2) What explains variation in formal constraints on trial judge discretion in the American states? Trial judges are powerful actors in the American political system and the method of choosing and otherwise constraining them have been debated since the American founding. Concerns with judicial power have not, however, generated commensurate comparative empirical research on the consequences for trial judge behavior of different selection systems or ex ante constraints on judicial discretion. Moreover, political scientists have not undertaken much comparative work to explain variation in the adoption of restrictions on trial judge discretion. We seek to remedy this weakness by constructing and testing an agency-theoretic model of the selection, retention, and direct control of trial judges. This research will assist in providing empirical evidence for, and will contribute to, ongoing public policy debates about the consequences of different rules for selecting and retaining trial court judges. Unlike existing research on selection systems that focuses on voter behavior, electoral outcomes, or descriptive characteristics of judges, the researchers undertake a direct comparative examination of trial judge behavior. Further, they seek to understand how ex ante constraints on discretion like sentencing guidelines and mandatory sentences interact with selection systems to influence trial judges' behavior. While political scientists have examined the behavior of appellate court judges in different electoral systems, these findings maynot extend to the actions of the more numerous and less publicly visible trial judges whose actions in large part govern the case-by-case application of the state's coercive authority. The researchers will continue research currently underway, to compile three datasets for quantitative analysis and to conduct unstructured qualitative interviews with sitting trial judges in a variety of institutional contexts. The project offers two significant downstream benefits. First, the investigators construct and document three datasets detailing judicial sentencing behavior, the selection experience and biographical characteristics of trial judges, and the nature of direct constraints on judicial discretion. These datasets and accompanying documentation will be placed in the public domain. These datasets will complement research on state appellate courts and allow other researchers to conduct comparative research on judicialselection, trial judge behavior, and state criminal justice policymaking. Second, undertaking this research will provide opportunities to enhance the training of graduate students by involving them in the construction, documentation, and analysis of the datasets used in this project.